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TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS AS
BARRIERS TO THE TRANSBORDER
FLOW OF INFORMATION
Joseph P. Markoskit
Ever since the enactment of the Swedish Data Bank Statute in
1972,1 the debate over transborder dataflow has focused on
legislative initiatives aimed at the protection of personal privacy.2
The attention given to such privacy protection measures has b.en
understandable, particularly in light of the emphasis that these
legislative efforts have placed on the use of novel administrative
requirements such as data protection boards and mandatory
licensing.3 Also understandable are the arguments that have arisen
as to whether the goal of such legislation is the protection of personal
privacy or the protection of domestic industry.4
t Partner, Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker, Washington, D.C. B.S.F.S. 1970, J.D.
1973, Georgetown University. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the
views of Mr. Markoski's clients or his law firm.
1. See Swedish Data Bank Statute of May 11, 1973, rerintedin U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, SELECTED FOREIGN NATIONAL DATA
PROTECTION LAWS AND BILLS 70 (C. Wilk ed. 1978).
2. See, ag., Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy
Protection or Non-tariff Trade Barriers, 10 L. & PoiY Ir'eL Bus. 1055 (1978); Marks,
Crossborder Data Nets Become Targets of European Lawmakers, DATA
COMMUNICATIONS (1978); Symposium--Transborder Data Flow, 16 STAN. 3. INT'L L. I
(1980); Address by Richard L. Crandall, President, Comshare, Inc., Computer Law
Association Program, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 9, 1979) (on file at CornellInternational
Law Journal). For a di-cussion of European privacy protection laws in the context of the
societal and economic goals of the Commission of the European Communities, see
Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Challenge of the New Information Technologies: .4
Teleinformatics Strategyfor the 1980s, 14 CORNELL INhT'L L.J. 237, 243-45 (1981). For a
similar discussion of the approach taken by the developing countries, see Bortnick, Inter-
national Information Flow The Developing World Perspective, 14 CORELL INT'L U.
333, 333-43 (1981).
3. Enforcement mechanisms such as licensing, self-regulation, or national privacy
commissions are considered among the most important dimensions of privacy protection
legislation. See Turn, Privacy Protection and Security in Transnatiai Data Processing
Systems, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 67 (1980). See also U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMMISSION, REPORT, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN lNFORMATION SOCIETY 500, 502
(1977).
4. See Kirby, Transborder Data Flows and the "Basic Rules" of Data Privacy, 16
STAN. J. INT'L L. 27, 28 (1980); Eger, supra note 2, at 1095-1103.
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What is somewhat surprising, however, is the relatively little
attention that has been given to those barriers to the transborder flow
of information that purposefully impede commerce. 5 No pretense or
effort has been made to cloak these barriers with the mantle of
principle, such as respect for individual privacy or the preservation
of cultural identity. Rather, the only apparent goal of these
measures has been to restrict the flow of information across national
boundaries. Although unlike more traditional customs-type
barriers,6 these obstacles to trade have proven to be equally effective
in impeding the free flow of information among nations.
This article will examine the use of such restrictions by several
representative nations and will evaluate the reaction of the United
States, particularly that of the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission), to these non-tariff barriers to trade.7 Generally
speaking, the Commission's response to these barriers has been less
than effective. Although operating under an extremely flexible
statutory charter, the Commission appears to have adopted a
relatively narrow view of its responsibility and authority to secure
the removal ofdlataflow restrictions. Other instrumentalities of the
federal government, though more aggressive in their approach to
5. But see Bus. WEEK, Aug. 3, 1981, at 10.
6. As Alain M. Madec, Chairman of the French Commission on Transborder Data
Flows, has recognized, information is generally not regulated or controlled by traditional
mechanisms.
International exchanges of information concern an asset of universal value
which can generate wealth or power for those who hold it. Oddly enough
though, these flows are largely untouched by the traditional rules governing
trade in products: they seldom appear in the accounts of those concerned and,
where made between related bodies, are rarely invoiced at their "transfer price."
Neither are they recorded by the customs, and their very volume often remains
unknown to the authorities.
Madec, Economic andLegalAspects of Transborder Data Flows 7, in OECD Doc. DST
I/ICCP/80.26, at 33, 34 (1980).
7. This article is limited to those restrictions that directly affect two-way
communications services and facilities, as opposed to one-way broadcast media that
disseminate news and general entertainment programming. Generally speaking, two-
way communications services have been traditionally classified as "common carriage"
and are regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) pursuant
to Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (Supp. III 1979).
See Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-41 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); Semon v. Royal Indem. Co., 279 F.2d 737,739 (5th Cir.
1960); Home Ins. Co. v. Riddell, 252 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1958); Ciaccio v. New Orleans
Pub. Belt R.R., 285 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. La. 1968). The Commission, however, is
currently in the process of reevaluating its traditional classification and regulation of
common carriers and their service offerings. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 84
F.C.C.2d 445 (1980) (Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The Commission
regulates broadcasting services pursuant to Title III of the Communications Act of 1934.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1976).
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dataflow barriers, have been unable to fill the void left by the
Commission.
Efforts are now underway in Congress to remedy this situation.
Proposals have been advanced to centralize responsibility for United
States telecommunications and information policies and to
encourage the Commission to pursue the removal of all restrictions
on the use of telecommunications services and facilities that serve as
barriers to trade and the free flow of information. Failing enactment
of these measures and in the absence of new initiatives by the
Executive, the status quo can be expected to continue.
I




Essential to an understanding of the many ways in which for-
eign telecommunications regulations have been used as non-tariff
barriers to American commerce is an appreciation of the differences
in the way that telecommunications services are provided and regu-
lated in the United States and abroad. Unlike the situation that
prevails in most of the countries with which the United States trades,
the private sector serves the telecommunications and associated
equipment needs of users in the United States. Basic telephone serv-
ice, as well as the more specialized voice and record communications
services that American industry requires, are provided by hundreds
of regulated and unregulated organizations that range in size from
the very small to the very large.8
8. Over 1,500 firms provide "Plain Old Telephone Service," or 'TOTS" as it is col-
loquially known. UNrrED STATES INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE ASS'N, PHoNE FACTS '81
16 (1981). These companies range in size from the Athens Telephone Company, whose
1979 operating revenues were $102,532, to the overwhelmingly dominant provider of
such service, American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), whose 1980 reve-
nues were $51.6 billion. See Opposition to Petitions for Reconsideration of United States
Independent Telephone Ass'n, F.C.C. Docket No. 20828, at 2 (filed Aug. 4, 1980); AT&T
'80 26 (1981).
Enterprises such as GTE-Telenet Communications Corporation and Tymnet, Inc.,
both of which will soon be deregulated, offer sophisticated data communications services
that enable computers to converse with other computers, terminals to converse with other
terminals, and computers to converse with terminals. See notes 16-19 infra and accom-
panying text. These services,, which employ such advanced technologies as packet
switching, provide users with extremely accurate and cost-efficient data communications.
In addition to their accuracy and efficiency, these service offerings enable disparate ter-
minals and computers to communicate with each other, thereby providing users with
greater flexibility in the equipment that they may utilize.
Domestic record services, such as telegraph, telex, and Mailgram service, are offered
predominantly by Western Union Telegraph Company, although it is experiencing
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, In the international arena, voice communications services are
provided almost exclusively by American Telephone and Telegraph
Company (AT&T). Record communications services9 are generally
provided by a group of much smaller carriers that, until recently,
were confined to the provision of purely international service.10 The
Commission, however, has proposed that the distinction between
international voice and record traffic be eliminated and that all carri-
ers be free to compete in the provision of both types of service."
The United States participates in the provision of international satel-
lite communications through the Communications Satellite
Corporation.' 2
In addition to providing transmission services, United States
carriers also offer their subscribers a wide variety of communications
increasing competition. Hard copy facsimile services are provided by Graphnet Systems,
Inc. and others. Facsimile offerings enable users to transmit documents such as truck
permits when an exact duplicate of the original document is needed at a distant location.
In addition to these specialized services, a variety of satellite and terrestrial carriers
provide private line services to users who require instant access to facilities dedicated to
their exclusive use. Apart from uses in data and voice communications, private line serv-
ice, particularly satellite service, is often used to transmit television signals to cable televi-
sion operators.
The foregoing are but a few of the many services and organizations that satisfy the
specialized communications needs of users in the United States. A more comprehensive
enumeration of services, carriers, and other providers of service would be too voluminous
for mention here. Such an enumeration would also be out-of-date shortly after
publication.
9. Voice and record (telegraph/data/facsimile/non-voice) communications services
have historically been offered by different carriers with different facilities, both within the
United States and between the United States and overseas points. This dichotomy "ini-
tially arose from the acquisition of the patent rights to these two technologies by different
entities, AT&T and Western Union." Overseas Communications Servs., 84 F.C.C.2d
622, 623 (1980) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
10. The United States international record carriers (IRCs) include ITT World Com-
munications Inc., RCA Global Communications Inc., TRT Telecommunications, Inc.,
Western Union International, Inc., FTC Communications, Inc., and United States-Libe-
ria Radio Corporation. The FCC authorized these carriers to expand their international
operations into the domestic market in early 1980. See International Record Carriers, 76
F.C.C.2d 115 (1979), af'dsub not Western Union TeL Co. v. FCC, No. 79-2494 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 3, 1981). As a result, Western Union is facing greater competition in the area
of domestic record service. See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1980, at 62.
11. See Overseas Communications Servs., 84 F.C.C.2d 622 (1980) (Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking). At present, AT&T's customers can transmit data, facsimile, or other
record communications over AT&T's international voice circuits, but only on a secon-
dary use basis. Similarly, customers of the international record carriers can use interna-
tional record circuits for voice traffic, but only on a secondary use basis. The
Commission's proposal would completely eliminate any restrictions on the services that
either AT&T or the international record carriers may provide.
12. See Communications Satellite Act of 1962,47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1976). At pres-
ent, Comsat does not serve the public directly. It functions as a "carrier's carrier" by
providing satellite transmission channels to other carriers for resale to the public. The
Commission is currently considering whether it should permit Comsat to deal directly
with the public. See Aeronautical Radio, Inc., 77 F.C.C.2d 535 (1980) (Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking).
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equipment ranging in sophistication from the basic telephone hand-
set to advanced network control equipment.' 3 A substantial number
of equipment manufacturers that are not affiliated with common car-
riers also supply equipment to communications users. 14 The Com-
mission does not regulate these "interconnect" firms, as the suppliers
of customer-premises equipment are often called.' 5
13. Until recently, the Commission regulated the offering of equipment by communi-
cations common carriers under Title II of the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C.
§§ 201-224 (Supp. III 1979); 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (1980). In a proceeding popularly known
as the Second Computer Inquiry, the Commission determined that the provision of termi-
nal equipment by common carriers is not subject to Title II regulation and that such
equipment should be offered separate and apart from transmission services. See Amend-
ment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384,438-47, on recon., 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 65-68, 98-105 (1980), appeal
docketed sub nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, No. 80-1471
(D.C. Cir. May 5, 1980) on further recon., F.C.C. 81-481 (released Oct. 30, 1981). As a
result, any equipment not in service as of January 1, 1983, must be offered on a non-
tariffed basis after that date. F.C.C. 81-481, 69. The Commission has deferred, until a
later date, consideration of the regulatory treatment it will accord customer-premises
equipment that is currently in place and offered pursuant to federal or state tariffs. Id. at
144.
14. For many years, telephone company tariffs contained blanket prohibitions
against the interconnection of any customer-provided terminal equipment to the tele-
phone network. This prohibition extended to telephone book covers, shoulder rests
attached to the receiver, and locks on the dial of the telephone handset. See Economic
Implications & Interrelationships Arising from Policies & Practices Relating to Customer
Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations & Rate Structures, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 780 n.3
(1976). These restrictions were successfully challenged in Hush-A-Phone Corp. v.
United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). There, the court held that AT&T could not
prohibit the attachment of a Hush-A-Phone (a cup-like device that is attached to the
telephone handset to obtain privacy in making telephone calls) to the network. In so
doing, the court concluded that users have the right to use their telephones "in ways
which are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimentaL" Id. at 269.
In Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, recon.
denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968), the Commission invalidated an AT&T tariff provision
that prohibited the interconnection of a Carterfone, a device that connects mobile radio
systems to the interstate telephone network. After Carterfone, AT&T permitted the inter-
connection of customer-provided equipment, but required users of non-Bell equipment
to utilize "connecting arrangements" or "network control signalling units" that the Bell
System provided. The ostensible purpose of these devices was to protect the communica-
tions network from harm. Independent equipment manufacturers and their customers,
however, found these devices to be expensive, poorly designed, and difficult to main ain.
The Commission ultimately held that the tariff provisions requiring the use of these
devices unjustifiably discriminated against users and suppliers of independent terminal
equipment. To safeguard the network, the Commission adopted a registration program
as a less restrictive alternative. See 47 C.F.R. § 68 (1980). Under this program, indepen-
dently supplied terminal equipment may be connected to the network, if the equipment
or its protective circuitry is registered with the Commission. See Interstate and Foreign
Message Toll Telephone, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), a'd sub nom. North Carolina Util.
Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977). The Cana-
dian Radio-Television-and-Telecommunications Commission has recently announced a
similar program. The rules, though less liberal than those prevailing in the United
States, permit the attachment of subscriber-provided terminal equipment to the Bell
Canada network. See CRTC Decision No. 80-13 (Aug. 5, 1980).
15. The Commission has never regulated independent suppliers of terminal equip-
ment under Title II of the Act. In the Second Computer Inquir; however, the Commis-
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Regulated common carriers and unregulated computer service
firms also participate in another communications-related market-
the provision of "enhanced services."'16 A regulatory term of art of
relatively recent vintage, an "enhanced service" is a melange of com-
munications and data processing services in which computer
processing is used, inter alia, to "act on the format, content, code,
protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted informa-
tion." 17 Comprised of offerings that have traditionally been viewed
as two distinct services-regulated communications and unregulated
data processing-1 8 enhanced services have been found by the Com-
mission to be beyond the scope of its common carrier jurisdiction.19
The creation of this vast unregulated market has dramatically
increased the already large number of entities that serve the needs of
the American public.
The Federal Communications Commission oversees the provi-
sion of interstate and foreign communications in the United States.
An independent agency of the federal government, the Commis-
sion's statutory mandate is "to make available, so far as possible, to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide and
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges .... -20 Guided by an obligation to
assure that its decisions serve the "public convenience, interest and
necessity," 21 the Commission functions as a public interest manager
sion declined to rule whether customer-provided equipment supplied by non-common
carriers is subject to its jurisdiction under Title I of the Act. See Second Computer
Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 100 (1981).
16. See generally Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387, 417-35, 457-90
(1980).
17. Id. at 498; see also id. at 420-30.
18. See id. at 435.
19. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 428, 430 (1980), on recon., 84
F.C.C.2d 50, 89 (1981). The Commission made a factual determination that "enhanced
services," whether provided by communications common carriers or other entities, are
not common carrier services. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C..2d at 430.
Whereas the Commission generally asserted Title I jurisdiction over enhanced services, it
qualified that claim with the statement that "we need not and should not resolve in the
abstract questions of whether any enhanced services, while clearly not within our Title II
jurisdiction, may be otherwise within ourjurisdiction." 84 F.C.C.2d at 92. The Commis-
sion continues to regulate basic transmission service, in which "a carrier essentially offers
a pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent
in terms of its interaction with customer-supplied information," as Title II common car-
riage. 77 F.C.C.2d at 420. This may change, however, as a result of a rulemaking pro-
ceeding now underway. See Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Servs. & Facilities Authorization Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981) (Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). State regulatory commissions regulate purely intrastate
communications services. See id. § 152(b).
21. Id. § 214(a).
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of competing, commercially oriented communications interests.22
Significantly, the Commission does not itself provide communica-
tions services or equipment.
In addition to its domestic responsibilities, the Commission also
participates in a "consultative process" with foreign telecommunica-
tions authorities.23 Notwithstanding its traditional involvement in
the consultative process, the Commission does not have .ny author-
ity to engage in international negotiations.24 Consequently, the
Commission has never acted as the sole representative of the United
States before such bodies as the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) or ITU's International Telegraph and Telephone Con-
sultative Committee (CCITT).25 Indeed, as an independent agency
of the federal government, the Commission can speak only for itself,
and then only in the areas reserved to it by the Communications Act
of 1934.
The diverse market for telecommunications in the United States
stands in marked contrast to the relative simplicity of telecommuni-
cations in most other countries of the world.26 Elsewhere on the
globe, the provision of communications services, and associated
22. The Commission, for example, assures that carriers furnish services at reasonable
charges upon reasonable request, that the construction and use of communications facili-
ties are consistent with the public interest, and that carriers do not discriminate among
users either in their charges or practices. See id. §§ 201, 202, 214.
23. See generally Policies for Overseas Common Carrier Facilities, 73 F.C.C.2d 193
(1979). In October 1979, ITT World Communications Inc. (ITT) filed a petition for
rulemaking with the Commission, in which it argued "that the Commission lacks author-
ity to engage in discussions with foreign governments and telecommunications entities
.... " ITT World Communications Inc., 77 F.C.C.2d 877, 878 (1980). The Commis-
sion disagreed, and explained that it does not engage in "negotiations" with foreign enti-
ties, only "informal conferences." Id. at 883. The Commission, however, conceded that
international negotiations are the exclusive domain of the Department of State. See id
at 884 n.4; 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1976).
ITT subsequently brought suit to enjoin the Commission's participation in the "con-
sultative process" with foreign government instrumentalities. See ITT World Communi-
cations Inc. v. FCC, No. 80-0428 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1721
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 1980). The district court dismissed ITTs complaint, on standing and
ripeness grounds. In dicta, however, the district court indicated that it had serious doubts
that ITT could prove that the Commission's participation in the "consultative process"
was "patently ultra vires." Id. at 4.
24. See ITT World Communications Inc., 77 F.C.C.2d at 884 n.4.
25. See notes 69-72 infra and accompanying text.
26. In his classic work on the development of the Bell System in the United States,
John Brooks noted the historical differences between the evolution of telecommunica-
tions in the United States and abroad:
Telephony had been making a shaky and erratic debut in other countries around
the world. Almost everywhere, its early development contrasted sharply with
that in the United States in two respects: That the telephones were owned or
controlled to some extent by government rather than by private interests, and
that telephone service was received with a marked lack of enthusiasm by the
public.
J. BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 91-92 (1975). But see note 34
infra.
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equipment is considered a government monopoly.27 Generally
speaking, either the postal ministry, a public corporation, or a pri-
vate corporation controlled or partially owned by the government
provides such services.28 In some countries, such as Japan, the pro-
vision of domestic service is organizationally separated from the pro-
vision of international service, although both are subject to the postal
authority.29 Competition in the provision of communications serv-
ices and equipment is, therefore, largely unknown in most
countries.30
Because of the absence of private sector involvement, a foreign
telecommunications authority, or PTT as it is commonly known,31
27. The existence of state-owned telecommunications monopolies in Europe has not
worked to the benefit of equipment users. Although European telecommunications
authorities closely cooperate with respect to the provision of services, the equipment used
in one country cannot be used elsewhere on the continent. See Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, New Information Technologies: First Commission Report, Dec.
COM (80) 513 final, at 2-3 (1980) (recommending the establishment of a uniform market
for telecommunications technologies throughout the EEC). In the United States, how-
ever, continent-wide standards have emerged, even in the presence of competition among
hundreds of supplier- of communications equipment. For a discussion of the problems
presented by the lack of continent-wide standards in Europe, see Ramsey, supra note 2,
at 245-57.
28. In West Germany, for example, the Bundespost directly operates the communi-
cations network. In the United Kingdom, telecommunications service was, until very
recently, provided by the British Post Office. Now a public corporation, British Telecom-
munications Corporation, provides telecommunications service. In Japan, a private cor-
poration provides international service. See note 29 infra.
29. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation is Japan's domestic car-
rier. It is also the largest supplier of computer services in that country. International
service is provided by a private corporation, Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd. The
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications oversees both of these organizations.
30. There are exceptions, however. In July 1980, the British government announced
plans to end the telecommunications monopoly of the British Post Office. A new entity,
British Telecommunications Corporation, has been established to manage telecommuni-
cations in the United Kingdom. Although the precise extent to which competition will
emerge is not yet clear, it appears that the British government will permit users to con-
nect at least some independently supplied equipment to the network. In addition, it is
possible that some value-added services may be provided by independent companies.
See Statement of Sir Keith Joseph, on Telecommunications, Before the House of Com-
mons (London, July 21, 1980); DATAMATION, Oct. 1979, at 78; THE ECoNOMIsT, Dec. 6,
1980, at 64. The likely benefits of competition in the provision of communications serv-
ices of competition were addressed in depth by a report prepared at the request of Brit-
ain's Department of Industry. See M. BEESLEY, LIBERALISATION OF THE USE OF
BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK (1981).
The European Economic Community has also recently encouraged the relaxation of
government procurement practices in an effort to promote the European Community as
the leading supplier of European telecommunications needs. See Commission of Euro-
pean Communities, New Information Technologies: First Commission Report, Dec.
COM (80) 513 final (1980); Ramsey, supra note 2, at 251, 256-57.
Canada has also attempted to promote competition in the telecommunications indus-
try by authorizing the attachment of the Canadian National/Canadian Pacific network
to Bell Canada's network. DATAMATION, supra, at 78.
31. An acronym for postal, telephone, and telegraph authority, the term PTT is gen-
erally used to describe all foreign telecommunications administrations.
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acts not only as the regulator, but also as the regulated. As such, a
PTT has the ability to formulate and enforce policies in furtherance
of both its postal and telecommunications activites. 32 As an often-
times powerful and influential arm of the government,33 a PTT can
also implement other policies or goals that may not be consistent
with the provision of economical and efficient telecommunications
services. In this regard, a PTT is often free to structure technical
standards, tariffs, and policies so as to achieve results consistent with
its government's economic or political goals at home and abroad.34
Moreover, as both the regulator and provider of communications
service, a PTT can also effectively negotiate with foreign carriers and
international communications organizations. PTTs are, therefore,
well-situated to implement telecommunications policies and regula-
tions that may be inconsistent with the free flow of information
across national borders.
The implications of the above differences between the telecom-
munications infrastructure of the United States and that of most
other nations are particularly significant in the area of transborder
dataflow. Whereas a foreign PTT can adopt policies in furtherance
of its own business needs or the goals of its government, the Com-
mission lacks such freedom. Indeed, the Commission is powerless to
32. The French Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications et Telediffusion, a govern-
ment organization which has its own government-funded research body, the Centre
National d'Etudes des Telecommunications (CNET) overseas France's telephone net-
work. In 1975, the French government placed high priority on the development and
modernization of its telephone network and authorized the PIT to spend $30 billion to
achieve its goals. CNET has thus been able to engage in long-range planning in its
research and development and has served as a catalyst for the French telecommunica-
tions industry. See generaly Stratte-McClure, French Telecommunications: Digital Tech-
nology and the Telematique Program, Supp. TO ELECTRONIC NEws & SCIENTIFIC
AMEIcAN 13 (1980).
33. For a discussion of the economic and political power that many PTTs enjoy, see
Ramsey, supra note 2, at 262-64.
34. Bureaucratic diffusion and lack of coordination have also been problems in the
telecommunications infrastructures of other countries. The famous Nora & Minc
Report, for example, discussed the problems presented by the structure of the telecom-
munications bureaucracy in France:
The administrative connection of telecommunications organizations fluctuates
with the rhythm of governmental reorganizations. While the GTB [General
Telecommunications Board] remains riverted to Postal Service and Telecommu-
nications, TDF [Tele-Diffusion de France] has been joined to the Governmt nt's
Press Office, and after the disappearance of this ministry, directly to the Prime
Minister. For its part, the CNES [Center National d'Etudes Spatiales] depends
on the Industrial Ministry.
This administrative dispersion makes a common policy difficult, even impossi-
ble. The divergences are kept quiet and remain in an obscurity which allows
each organization to pursue its own policy. Arbitrations in the Prime Minister's
cabinet, when they take place, become even easier as TDF depends directly on
its guardianship.
S. Nora & A. Mine, Report on the Computerization of Society 54 (1978) (on file at Cor-
nell International Law Journal).
1981]
296 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:287
act in any way that does not further its statutory mandate or that is
inconsistent with its public interest responsibilities.35 Further, a PTT
can participate directly in international organizations such as
CCITT, and defend and advance its domestic and international tele-
communications policies. The Commission, however, cannot act so
directly and must rely on the efforts of others to champion its poli-
cies.36 Moreover, because a PTT itself provides communications
services and deals directly with other administrations and carriers, it
always operates on the basis of firsthand information. The Commis-
sion, on the other hand, must operate solely on the basis of informa-
tion supplied by members of the private sector who provide service,
construct facilities, and conduct business with foreign telecommuni-
cations administrations.
The limited scope of the Commission's statutory charter, as
compared to that of a foreign PTT, has become increasingly appar-
ent as the Commission has been called upon to take cognizance of,
and to take action to eliminate, restrictions imposed on the trans-
border flow of data by foreign telecommunications administrations.
When tested by 'determined resistance, the Commission has proven
itself unable to achieve the speedy removal of such restrictions. The
Commission's failures, however, are merely symptomatic of the
larger inadequacies of the federal government.
When other agencies, such as the Department of State, the
Department of Commerce, and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative have become involved in transborder dataflow dis-
putes, the results have been somewhat more favorable but the
response time has been excessive. In large part, this is because the
responsibility for national telecommunications and information pol-
icy is divided among many agencies, 37 no one of which has primary
or exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, when users of international
communications services have demanded that the United States gov-
ernment take action to eliminate transborder dataflow restrictions-
and that is the only time that the government has done so--the
results have not been promising.38
35. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 214 (1976).
36. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
37. In 1978, the President distributed responsibility for telecommunications functions
among the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget, the Direc-
tor of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of State, the General
Services Administration, and the National Security Council. See Exec. Order No.
12,046, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,349 (1978); Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics: An
Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 234-36 (1981).
38. The House of Representatives exhaustively studied the need for a comprehensive
national approach to international information policy during the 96th Congress. See
H.R. REP. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). In an effort to remedy the "fragmented,
uncoordinated, confused and confficting structure within the executive branch for the
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The growth of international data communications traffic39 and
the increasing use of private leased channel networks4° by American
data processors and multinational organizations appear to have been
the immediate impetus behind the first efforts of foreign PTTs to
restrict and thereby gain control of information crossing national
borders. Because leased channels are available at flat monthly
rates,41 users with large communications needs have historically
development and implementation of international telecommunications and information
policies," Congressman English introduced the International Communications Reorgan-
ization Act of 1981, H.R. 1957, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H532 (1981).
39. The Eurodata Study documented the growth of international data communica-
tions. The initial results of this study, which was commissioned by a consortium of Euro-
pean PTrs, were presented at an ad hoc meeting of experts convened by the Working
Party on Information, Computer and Communications Policy of the Directorate for Sci-
ences, Technology and Industry of the OECD. The results were reported as follows:
-There are approximately 13 million data communications transactions each
day in Western Europe. Of these approximately 10 per cent are international;
this rather high share contrasts with voice traffic, where only 1 per cent of
transactions are international.
-These transactions yield a total revenue to the PTTs of approximately U.S.
$2,000 million, of which international traffic accounts for a quarter. The aver-
age cost per transaction is approximately 6 cents per transaction overall and 15
cents per international transaction. With an average message size of 12,000
words (10,000 [sic] bits), this is signficiantly cheaper than telex.
-In fact, data communication now accounts for a greater total flow of traffic
than does telex.
-The total volume of international data communications can be divided into
two components: those transactions which, because they involve a message
transmittal function, are international by necessity; and those transactions
whose objective (for example, to access processing power) could be achieved
locally. These are not hard and fast categories; but initial calculations suggest
that 43 per cent of the total is international by necessity, 40 per cent could be
carried out locally and 17 per cent could not be attributed to either category.
-Finally, the total number of data communications transactions in Western
Europe is expected to increase at a compound annual rate of 25 per cent over
the period 1979-1987, while the number of international data communications
transactions will increase at an annual compound rate exceeding 30 per cent.
OECD, Transborder Data Flows and Data Communications Policies, in OECD Doc. DST
I/ICCP/80.27, at 1-2 (1980).
40. A leased channel network is, generally speaking, a private communications or
data processing network that the user of the network organizes, operates, and maintains.
The user obtains the leased circuits and other communications facilities comprising the
network from common carriers. Network control equipment, terminals, and other equip-
ment may be owned by the user or leased from carriers or others. No communications
traffic, other than that which the user properly authorizes, transits the network.
41. See CCITT ORANGE BOOK, GENERAL TARIFF PRINCIPLES-LEASE OF CIRCUITS
FOR PRIVATE SERVICE, VoL I., Recommendation D.l, at 3-9 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
CCITT ORANGE BOOK].
19811
298 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:287
found such circuits much more economical than usage-sensitive
services such as telex.42 Being transparent,43 leased circuits also pro-
vide users with the flexibility to adapt these channels to their individ-
ual needs. This flexibility has enabled users to exploit advances in
technology and to dramatically increase the amount of information
that can be transmitted with added accuracy over these circuits. As
new technology has increased the efficiency of these lines, the rela-
tive cost of individual transmissions has decreased. These savings, in
turn, have encouraged greater use of leased circuits-all without the
intervention of, and without any significant increase in revenues for,
the PTTs and participating carriers.
A. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS OF A POLICY SHIFT
. The SWIFT-CE-PT Controversy
The first major organized effort by foreign PTTs to curtail the
use of private networks occurred in Europe. In 1973, the Society of
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) was
incorporated as'a cooperative non-profit society for the purpose of
developing and operating an international communications network
that would serve the needs of the world-wide banking community.44
The SWIFT network was conceived as a leased channel network that
would allow banks to achieve greater security and accuracy in their
interbank transactions than was possible using telex or public tele-
gram service.45 The network was also intended to be substantially
less expensive than existing public services.46
Faced with the potential diversion of substantial amounts of
traffic from their telex operations, European PTTs, acting through
the Conference of European Post and Telecommunications Admin-
istrations (CEPT),47 formed a study group to devise a means of
42. Unlike leased circuits, the price of overseas telex service is based on the length of
individual messages, calculated by time. In certain instances, users are charged a fixed
minimum, even if an individual message is shorter than the minimum. See, e.g., Western
Union Int'l, Inc., Tariff F.C.C. No. 5 5; ITT World Communications Inc., Joint Tariff
F.C.C. No. 12 § D; RCA Global Communications Inc., Tariff F.C.C. No. 90 3. See
also Western Union Telegraph Co., Tariff F.C.C. No. 240 5.
43. A transparent circuit is one which does not interact in any way with the informa-
tion or data being transmitted over the circuit. Every signal transiting the circuit, voice
or data exits with exactly the same characteristics it had when it entered the circuit.
44. Nacamuli, Swift: Objectives, Standardization, Availability, Auditabilily, Security,
Privacy and Liability, 3 TPANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 6, at 7 (1980).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 9.
47. CEPT is a 26-member body of European postal and telecommunications authori-
ties governed by a biennial plenary conference and two permanent commissions, one
dealing with posts and the other with telecommunications.
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recapturing revenues from SWIFT.48 Two proposals emerged from
the study. The first was to add a surcharge of not more than 150
percent of the cost of a basic leased circuit to the price of each leased
circuit needed by SWIFT.49 The second was to charge for leased
circuits solely on the basis of the volume of information transmit-
ted.50 Neither proposal bore any relationship to the cost of provid-
ing the facilities SWIFT needed. After substantial confrontation,
CEPT announced in May 1976 that the charges for SWIFT lines
would be computed on the basis of both a flat rate and a per message
element.51 The effect of the CEPT proposal was to increase the cost
of using SWIFT by two to four hundred percent for communications
among European banks and by one thousand percent for communi-
cations between European and North American banks.52 In short,
the CEPT proposal threatened the economic viability of the SWIFT
network even before it began operations.
2. The Inauguration of Usage-Sensitive Data Services Between the
United States and the United Kingdom
SWIFT's difficulties with CEPT soon became a factor in a
wholly unrelated proceeding before the Commission. In the fall of
1976, Western Union International, Inc. (WUI), a United States
international record carrier (IRC), announced plans to inaugurate a
data communications service priced on a usage-sensitive basis5 3
between the United States and the United Kingdom.54 Because
WUI's usage-sensitive offering constituted a new service for which
WUI required a certificate of public convenience and necessity from
the Commission,55 interested parties had an opportunity to comment
on whether WUI's new offering would be consistent with the public
48. See CENTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LNC., NEW TRENDS IN
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 35-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 CCMI
REPORT].
49. Minutes of the Meeting of Conference of European Postal and Telecommunica-
tions Administrations (CEPT) Study Group "General Principles and Tariffs" (Florence,
Italy Oct. 2-8, 1975), reprinted in 1976 CCMI REPORT, su.pra note 48, app. B at 7.
50. Id. app. B, at 8.
51. Id. at 39.
52. Id. at 40. For a discussion of the legitimacy of CEPT's actions with respect to
SWIFT under the Treaty of Rome, see Ramsey, supra note 2, at 279-81.
53. The charge for the new service was to be based on the number of characters
transmitted, as well as the duration of the message. These usage-sensitive charges would
be in addition to a fixed monthly charge.
54. See Application of Western Union Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2658 (filed
Nov. 9, 1976). WUI's proposed service offered small users an equivalent to the sophisti-
cated data communications services previously available only to users of large private
leased channel networks.
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976); Letter from W.R. Hinchman, Chief, Common Car-
rier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, to Western Union Int'l, Inc. (Nov.
12, 1976) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
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interest.56
Two associations composed of users of international communi-
cations services petitioned the Commission to deny WUI a certificate
of public convenience and necessity on the grounds that WUI's
introduction of usage-sensitive service was part of a concerted effort,
evidenced by the SWIFT-CEPT dispute, to eliminate or curtail the
availability of flat-rate leased channel service.57 In their filings, the
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
(ADAPSO)58 and the Computer and Business Equipment Manufac-
turers Association (CBEMA) 59 urged the Commission to deny
WUI's application for operating authority unless it was conditioned
upon the continued availability of leased channel service.60 In
essence, the two groups sought the Commissions's assurance that
WuI's new service would complement, rather than replace, flat-rate,
transparent private line service.6 1
Both ADAPSO and CBEMA stressed the importance of private
line circuits in the provision of advanced computer processing serv-
ices, and how the continued availability of such circuits serves the
public convenience and necessity.62 Neither ADAPSO nor CBEMA,
however, focused upon the fact that the elimination of private line
service would constitute a barrier to the free flow of information.
The petitioners were apparently reticent to advance what would
have then been considered a novel construction of the Commission's
56. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 63.52 (1980).
57. Petition to Deny Unless Conditioned, F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2658, at 8-11 (filed
Dec. 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as ADAPSO Petition to Deny]; Response of Computer
& Business Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, F.C.C. File No. 1-T-C-2658, at 9-10 (filed Dec. 22, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as CBEMA Response] ("The minutes of a CEPT meeting with the
IRC's. .. indicate that the European Administrations and the IRC's favor the introduc-
tion of enhanced, usage- or volume-sensitive services with rates much higher than present
private line circuits whenever the volume-sensitive services can be introduced.").
58. ADAPSO is the principal trade association of the United States computer serv-
ices industry. Its member companies provide the public with a broad range of computer
services such as local batch processing, software design and support, timesharing, and
other remote access data processing services.
59. CBEMA is a trade association of manufacturers of computer and business equip-
ment and vendors of data processing services.
60. ADAPSO argued that "[in order to assure that the proposed DBS offering is not
a step toward the reduction or curtailment of private line service, the Commission must
condition the effectiveness of WUI's authorization upon an express commitment by WUI
that it will not curtail the present use of private line service, and particularly that it will
not curtail use in connection with data processing activities:' ADAPSO Petition to
Deny, supra note 57, at 11.
61. CBEMA Response, supra note 57, at 12.
62. ADAPSO and CBEMA argued that the availability of private line circuits has
been an essential element in the development of remote access computer services. Pri-
vate line circuits can be used for alternate voice/data use, can be customized by the user,
and are easily susceptible to channel subdivision, high-speed transmission, and other
techniques that allow the user to obtain maximum efficiency. See CBEMA Response,
supra note 57, at 10; ADAPSO Petition to Deny, supra note 57, at 11.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULA TIONS
public interest responsibilities. Consequently, they advanced more
traditional arguments. For example, the two petitioners argued that
no service, particularly leased channel service, could be eliminated
or curtailed without an express Commission finding that the public
interest would be served thereby.63 Neither ADAPSO nor CBEMA,
however, was able to establish to the Commission's satisfaction a
direct and incontrovertible link between the introduction of wurs
proposed new service offering and CEPT's action with respect to
SWIFT. Although the Commission was made aware that WUI par-
ticipated in CEPT's efforts to restructure SWIFT's private line
rates,64 WUI itself had not fied any new tariff for its international
private line service.65 Similarly, there was nothing in its usage-sensi-
tive service application that expressly pertained to private line
service.
Although there was relatively little upon which the Commission
could base an order conditioning its approval of WUI's application,
there was also relatively little that militated against the imposition of
the *innocuous condition that ADAPSO and CBEMA had
requested. 66 Perhaps unimpressed by the parties' arguments, per-
haps mystified by their concern about an as yet unrealized threat to
leased channel service, and most probably distracted by other issues,
the Commission authorized WUI to offer its new data service.67 The
arguments of ADAPSO and CBEMA were relegated to a footnote:
CBEMA and ADAPSO also express concern that the introduction of the
WUI service may be a step toward the relinquishment of overseas private
line service offerings in favor of the usage-sensitive "shared" services
described here. The Commission recognizes the technical and economical
advantages to large volume users inherent in the use of overseas private line
services. Such services cannot be curtailed without appropriate authorization
from the Commission pursuant to Section 214.68
Thus, in its first contact with transborder dataflow issues, the
Commission viewed its obligations narrowly, perhaps awaiting a dis-
pute more ripe for adjudication. The proceeding, however, was
63. CBEMA argued that WUrs proposal "should be considered a partial discontinu-
ance of service" that requires a determination by the Commission that such a curtailment
of service would serve the public interest. See CBEMA Response, supra note 57, at 11
n.l; 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976). CBEMA also suggested that WUI's new service might be a
ruse to offer service essentially equivalent to leased channel circuits at a higher price, an
action that would violate the Commission's policy that the price of service must be based
on the cost of providing that service. See CBEMA Response, supra note 57, at 12 n.2.
64. See ADAPSO Petition to Deny, supra note 57, at 9; Minutes of the Joint Meeting
of CEPT Study Group "General Principles and Tariffs," reprited in 1976 CCMI
REPORT, su.pra note 49, app. B, at 7-8. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
65. As far as the Commission was concerned, WUI had not taken any formal action
with respect to its private line offerings that required agency intervention.
66. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
67. Graphnet Sys., Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 402, 407-10 (1977).
68. Id. at 410 n.9.
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nonetheless significant. The WUI dispute was the first time that a
party had advanced the restrictive practices of foreign telecommuni-
cations authorities as a reason for the Commission to deny operating
authority to a United States carrier.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA:
CCITT STUDY GROUP III
CCITT is one of four permanent organs of the ITU.6 9 Acting
through various study groups, 70 CCITT conducts studies and issues
Recommendations on a variety of technical and operational ques-
tions relating to telecommunications. These Recommendations have
their genesis in proposals--or "Contributions"--of participating
telecommunications administrations and recognized private operat-
ing agencies. Although many countries do not consider CCITT Rec-
ommendations to be binding, most administrations generally comply
with them.71 The CCITT Recommendations are to be contrasted
with the ITU's Telephone, Telegraph and Radio Regulations, which
are binding on,the ITU member countries that signed them.72
I. The Contributions of the Italian Administration and of Cable and
Wireless Ltd
In February 1977, with the SWIFT-CEPT dispute still
unresolved, the Italian Administration objected to the continuation
of flat-rate tariffs for international leased channel service. In a Con-
69. See International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 5, 28
U.S.T. 2497, T.I.A.S. No. 8572. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is
the oldest of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Id, Annex 3. Its predeces-
sor in interest, the International Telegraph Union, was established in 1865. The ITU
currently operates under the provisions of the International Telecommunications Con-
vention of 1973, which was drafted in Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain. See id. The pur-
poses of the ITU are:
a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and
rational use of telecommunications of all kinds;
b) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient
operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunications
services, increasingly their usefulness and making them, so far as possible,
generally available to the public;,
c) to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those ends.
Id. art. 4.
70. CCITT is subdivided into a series of organizations known as study groups, each
of which is assigned a specific area of responsibility. Oftentimes, these study groups are
broken down into working parties.
71. See ITT World Communications Inc., RCA Global Communications Inc.,
Western Union Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2664-1 1, I-T-C-2657-8, I-T-C-2678-1
(released Dec. 14, 1979) (Memorandum Opinion, Order, Authorization, and Certificate);
DATAMATION, Feb. 1978, at 194.
72. See International Telecommunications Convention, supra note 69, arts. 42, 54 &
TELECOMMUNICATIONS .REGUL,4TIONS
tribution to CCITT Study Group III,73 the Italian PTT urged the
group to take affirmative action to discourage the creation of addi-
tional private line networks. The unabashed purpose of the Italian
proposal was to "safeguard" PTT revenues. 74 Although the Contri-
bution did not propose a specific solution, the Italian Administration
urged the study group to investigate the possibility of replacing flat-
rate charges with usage-sensitive tariffs.
75
The Italian Administration's call for a study received considera-
ble support from a subsequent CCITT Contribution submitted by
Cable and Wireless Ltd. (Cable and Wireless), 76 Hong Kong's recog-
nized private operating agency. Although Cable and Wireless sup-
ported the continued availability of private line circuits,77 it
expressed a concern that such circuits were being used improperly.78
The precise language of the Contribution reflected a belief that pri-
vate line service should only be available to customers "using leased
circuits for their own traffic." 79 The question whether United States
remote access data processors were or should be considered to be
using their leased channel networks for their own traffic was left
unanswered.80
73. CCITT Study Group III, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. COM Ill-No. 6-
E (Feb. 1977) (Italian Administration).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CCITT Study Group III, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. COM Ill-No.
30-E (Dec. 1977) (Cable and Wireless Ltd.).
77. Id. 6.
78. The Cable and Wireless Contribution indicated:
We believe the major difficulty which has arisen in recent years with this method
of charging has been the use of dedicated customer leased circuit facilities by
users other than the customer. Naturally such use is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to define and is a field where many different interpretations are possible,
primarily because of the advent of present-day technology. In our opinion this is
the area where some disquiet has arisen among Administrations/RPOAs and in
consequence has led to the idea of volume sensitive tariffs being suggested. It
has to be borne in mind that all Administrations/RPOAs have a duty to provide
public service for all customers however small their traffic needs, and that they
are naturally concerned if any erosion of their public traffic takes place because
such action will reduce volumes on the public system and consequently increase
the costs of the remaining traffic and thus make it more expensive for public




80. Under now superseded rules, the Commission defined "remote access data
processing service" as "an offering of data processing wherein communications facilities,
linking a central computer to remote customer terminals, provide a vehicle for the trans-
mission of data between such computer and customer terminals." 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.702(a)(4) (1979). Implicit in this definition was the conclusion that the communica-
tions traffic travelling between terminal and computer belonged to the remote access data
processor. Otherwise, the data processor would be engaged in the business of selling
communications.
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2. The United States Response.
Notwithstanding the very real threat to private line service
posed by the Contributions of the Italian Administration and Cable
and Wireless, an immediate United States response was not forth-
coming from the Commission, the Department of State, or from any
other government agency. A response had to await the United States
CCITT delegation.
The United States CCITT delegation soon found itself tested by
the task of responding to the two Contributions. As the group met to
formulate a response, it became painfully apparent that the interests
of the United States IRCs, which provide services in conjunction
with foreign administrations and RPOAs, were not identical to those
of the United States users that pay for such services. Thus, the carri-
ers' representatives on the delegation were willing to state that the
United States "recognizes, and to some extent shares, the concerns
shown by the Italian Administration." 8' Users, however, particu-
larly those involved in the provision of remote access data processing
services, were unwilling to concede that a problem existed.8 2 Ulti-
mately, a response acceptable to users and carriers alike was adopted
and presented to CCITT Study Group III in early 1978.
In the first of a series of three Contributions, the United States
delegation made it unmistakably clear that "[t]he continuation of
leased circuits and networks for use in data processing systems and
other customer activities is a matter of primary concern to the
United States." 83 This theme was reinforced in a second Contribu-
tion that outlined "the United States of America's firm position that
leased circuits charged on a fiat monthly rental basis remain avail-
able to all users who require them."8 4 In answer to the fears
expressed both by Cable and Wireless and the Italian Administra-
tion concerning the misuse of leased circuits, a third Contribution
offered documentation of the steps taken under United States law to
assure that leased circuits are not and will not be used in contraven-
The rules now in effect do not define remote access data processing. Such services are
considered part of the larger regulatory category of "enhanced services," which may con-
tain elements of traditional communications and traditional data processing. See Second
Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 (1980). See generally notes 16-19 supra and
accompanying text.
81. DATAMATION, Feb. 1978, at 195.
82. Id.
83. CCITT Study Group III, International Private Leased Telecommunications Cir-
cuits and Networks, Doc. COM III-No. 34-E, 8 (Feb. 1978) (United States).
84. CCITT Study Group III, Comments on a Proposed Study of Leased Circuit Pric-
ing, Doc. COM III-No., 35-E, 5 (Feb. 1978) (United States).
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tion of CCITT Recommendations.8 5
C. THE HONG KONG DISPUTE
Between the introduction of the Italian Administration's Contri-
bution in early 1977, and the submission of the Cable and Wireless
Contribution later that year, the focus of debate shifted from the
CCITT to the Commission's formal administrative processes. The
event that sparked this shift was the refusal of Cable and Wireless to
provide an American data processor with private line service either
between the United States and Hong Kong or between Hong Kong
and Singapore.86 The timing of this refusal, as well as the context in
which it was made, seemed to suggest the existence of a concerted
effort to assure the demise of international leased channel service.
The problem arose when General Electric Company (GE),
which operates a world-wide data processing network known as
MARK III, attempted to expand its direct operations to include
Hong Kong. 87 Towards this end, GE entered into negotiations with
Cable and Wireless for the purpose of securing facilities to connect
its network to Hong Kong. During this same period, Cable and
Wireless was negotiating with the three major United States IRCs-
RCA Global Communications, Inc. (RCA), ITT World Communi-
cations Inc. (ITT), and WUI-for the purpose of initiating a usage-
senitive public data service between the United States and Hong
Kong.8 The proposed service was similar to the one that WUI (and
subsequently the other carriers) had previously initiated between the
85. See CCITT Study Group III, Uses of Private Leased Circuits, Doc. COM III-No.
38-E (Feb. 1978) (United States).
86. See Letter from L.A. Self, Cable and Wireless Ltd., to Robert F. Streight, Gen-
eral Electric Company (July 19, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Letter] (on file at Cornell
InternationalLaw Journal); Petition to Deny of Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organiza-
tions, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2664-2, I-T-C-2657-3, I-T-C-2658-2 (fied Nov. 3,
1977) [hereinafter cited as ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Hong Kong)]; Reply to Opposi-
tions to Petition to Deny of Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc., F.C.C.
File Nos. I-T-C-2664-2, I-T-C-2657-3, I-T-C-2658-2 (filed Nov. 29, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as ADAPSO Reply to Oppositions].
87. The GE MARK III system is a worldwide data processing network that com-
bines advanced timesharing and batch computing technologies. MARK III is accessible
by local telephone service in over 600 cities around the world. The system is designed to
serve the information needs of business and industry. See GENER.AL ELECTRIC INFOR-
MATION SERvIcEs COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL AccEss DIRECTORY, ACCESS AND SERV-
ICE INFORMATION 2 (July 1979).
88. In response to an ADAPSO petition, Walter R. Hinchman, Chief of the Commis-
sion's Common Carrier Bureau, directed the three IRCs to disclose the reports of their
negotiations with Cable and Wireless to ADAPSO. See Letter from Walter R. Hinch-
man, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, to Herbert
E. Marks (Jan. 16, 1978) (Reply No. 9140) (on file at Cornell Internarional Law Journal);
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.460, 43.51, 43.52 (1980).
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United Kingdom and the United States.89
The IRCs' negotiations proved to be successful; GE's did not.
In July 1977, Cable and Wireless announced the introduction of the
IRCs' new data services and advised GE that these services "will
satisfy your needs and the needs of others like yourself."90 Cable
and Wireless therefore concluded that, "[iun view of the foregoing,"
it would not provide GE with any leased channel service. 91
Denied private line service, GE was without recourse until Sep-
tember 1977, when the three United States IRCs petitioned the Com-
mission for authority to initiate their public data services between
the United States and Hong Kong.92 Had the carriers not been
required to obtain such authorization, GE would have been without
recourse and without service.93 Indeed, even with such a require-
ment, the Commission would have been unaware of Cable and
Wireless' action, unless GE had brought the situation to the Com-
mission's attention.
Acting in response to GE's request, ADAPSO petitioned the
Commission to deny the three carrier applications unless the Com-
mission, as a condition of its approval, required each applicant car-
rier to continue to provide transparent leased channel service at flat
monthly rates.94 In support of its petition, ADAPSO urged the
Commission to consider the record that had been developed since
WUI first received authority to provide public data service between
the United Kingdom and the United States.95 ADAPSO cited the
89. See notes 53-68 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Letter, note 86 sufpra.
91. Id.
92. Application & Request for Special Temporary Authority of Western Union Int'l,
Inc., F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2758-2 (filed Oct. 17, 1977); Application of ITT World Com-
munications Inc., F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2664-2 (filed Sept. 28, 1977); Application for
Authority of RCA Global Communications, Inc., F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2657-3 (filed
Oct. 11, 1977).
93. A similar situation that was not brought to the attention of the Commission was
the refusal of the Spanish PTT to provide private line service to an American user. See
DATAMATION, Feb. 1978, at 195. No opportunity to complain to the Commission arose,
since the Spanish PTT was not involved in the provision of any service in conjunction
with United States IRCs for which new or additional operating authority was required
under section 214 of the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
94. ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Hong Kong), supra note 86, at 17. ADAPSO also
asked the Commission to condition any grant of operating authority upon the IRCs"
agreement to provide each of their customers with written assurance of the continued
availability of private line service. Id. CBEMA also filed a petition with the Commis-
sion challenging the IRCs' proposed service offerings. See Petition for Relief of Com-
puter & Business Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2664-2, I-T-C-2657-3, I-T-
C-2658-2 (filed Nov. 10, 1977) [hereinafter cited as CBEMA Petition for Relief (Hong
Kong)].
95. See notes 53-68 supra and accompanying text.
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Italian Administration's proposal to CCITT,96 the testimony elicited
during then-recent hearings held by a House of Representatives Sub-
committee concerning transborder dataflow barriers,97 and the
actual denial of service to GE which Cable and Wireless had inextri-
cably linked to the introduction of the carriers' new data services. 98
ADAPSO advanced three major arguments. First, the Associa-
tion argued that Cable and Wireless' refusal of service amounted to
an unlawful discontinuation or curtailment of private line service
that required prior Commission approval.99 Second, ADAPSO
argued that even if Cable and Wireless' action did not amount to a
discontinuation of service, the leased channel service that was avail-
able was improperly subject to a condition not appearing in the car-
riers' published tariffs.10 Finally, ADAPSO asserted that it would
be against the public interest to allow the IRCs to take any action
that would force users to abandon private line circuits in favor of
public data services. 10' ADAPSO also outlined the economic and
technical advantages of private line circuits and their importance to
American commerce. Specifically, ADAPSO argued that the elimi-
nation of private line service would result in an "unnecessary dupli-
cation of communications equipment and the costs attendant thereto
unnecessary traffic over limited communications
resources,"'1 2 and a general decrease in the quality and efficiency of
data processing services.' 0 3
In their responses, the three applicant carriers disclaimed any
responsibility for Cable and Wireless' actions. More important, the
96. CCITT Study Group III, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. COM III-No. 6-
E (Feb. 1977) (Italian Administration). See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Transborder Data Flows Regulations.- Hearings Before the Subcomm on Com-
munications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 26-49 (1977).
98. Although Cable and Wireless was not before the Commission as a party,
ADAPSO argued that "[a]s one of the primary and necessary participants in the pro-
posed database services, the institutional pronouncements of Cable and Wireless Ltd.
must be deemed conclusive upon the three participating international record carriers cur-
rently before the Commission." ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Hong Kong), supra note 86,
at 10-11.
99. Id. at 11. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 63.01 (1980).
100. See ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Hong Kong), supra note 86, at 13; 47 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1976).
101. ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Hong Kong), supra note 86, at 14-16; CBEMA Peti-
tion for Relief (Hong Kong), supra note 94, at 8.
102. ADAPSO Petition to Deny,(Hong Kong), supra note 86, at 16.
103. Id. at 14. A collateral issue not really pursued in this dispute was whether the
three carriers had any statutory obligation to assist GE in its efforts to obtain the leased
channel service described in their tariffs. In only a slightly different context, the Com-
mission had found that ITT World Communications Inc. had an affirmative obligation
"to make reasonable efforts to arrange for the necessary connecting facilities required
locally and abroad." Mocatta Metals Corp. v. ITT World Communications Inc., 54
F.C.C.2d 104, 116 (1975).
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IRCs argued that the Commission was powerless to take any action
in response to Cable and Wireless' denial of service. °4 In doing so,
the carriers argued that the Commission's jurisdiction ended at the
"theoretical mid-point" between Hong Kong and the United States
to which they provided service. As to events beyond that theoretical
mid-point, the carriers portrayed themselves as disinterested
bystanders. l05 The IRCs also asserted that they had no intention of
curtailing or eliminating leased channel service in the Pacific
Basin.'0
Issue was thus clearly joined. Before the Commission could act,
however, Cable and Wireless submitted its Contribution to CCITT
Study Group III, in which it expressed support for the continued
availability of flat-rate private line service.' 0 7 Although the Contri-
bution specifically questioned the propriety of the use many parties
made of such circuits, it was not clear whether Cable and Wireless
objected to the use made of such circuits by remote access data
processors such as GE. It was also unclear whether this ambiguity
was intentional or whether the Contribution was submitted in
104. See Opposition of RCA Global Communications, Inc. to Petition for Relief,
F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2657-3 (filed Nov. 23, 1977); Opposition of ITT World Communi-
cations Inc. to Petition for Relief, F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2664-2 (filed Nov. 23, 1977);
Opposition of Western Union Int'l, Inc. to Petition to Deny, F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2658-
2 (filed Nov. 17, 1977) [hereinafter cited as WUI Opposition (Hong Kong)]; Opposition
of ITT World Communications Inc. to Petition to Deny, F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2664-2
(filed Nov. 16, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ITT Opposition (Hong Kong)]; Opposition of
RCA Global Communications, Inc. to Petition to Deny, F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-2657-3
(filed Nov. 17, 1977) [hereinafter cited as RCA Opposition (Hong Kong)].
In its opposition to ADAPSO's petition to deny, RCA emphasized:
if Cable and Wireless, or any other RCA Globcom overseas correspondent,
decides at some future date to discontinue leased channel or any other service,
there is little that can be done by RCA Globcom, ADAPSO, or the Commission
itself to alter the correspondents' decision.... Cable and Wireless is a foreign
entity over which neither the United States Government nor any of its citizens
can exercise sovereign authority.
Id. at 7.
105. See RCA Opposition (Hong Kong), supra note 104, at 5 ("RCA Globcom can
only be responsible for that portion of an interconnected overseas leased channel circuit
over which it has control. Both as a theoretical and a practical matter, such control and
responsibility end at the geographic midpoint between the United States and Hong
Kong."); ITT Opposition (Hong Kong), supra note 104, at 7; WUI Opposition (Hong
Kong), supra note 104, at 4-5.
106. See RCA Opposition (Hong Kong), supra note 104, at 8 ("RCA Globcom does
and will continue to furnish leased channel service to Hong Kong and elsewhere in addi-
tion to the novel service which constitutes the subject of its challenged application.");
ITT Opposition (Hong Kong), supra note 104, at 6; WUIl Opposition (Hong Kong), supra
note 104, at 4-5 ("WUI stands willing to provide private line service to any customer,
including members of ADAPSO, from its gateway to mid-ocean .... However, the
willingness or unwillingness of C & W to provide the necessary matching facilities to
Hong Kong and the terms under which such service is provided is a matter to be resolved
by C & W and the customer involved.").
107. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
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response to the proceedings underway before the Commission. Even
though the IRCs' proposed data services could not be provided with-
out Cable and Wireless, the Hong Kong carrier chose not to appear
before or become a named party in the proceedings. Its views, there-
fore, remained undisclosed.
Several months later, but before the Commission had ruled
upon the carriers' applications, a Working Party of CCITT Study
Group III met to consider the Contributions of the Italian Adminis-
tration, Cable and Wireless, the United States, and others. In May
1978, the members of the Working Party unanimously concluded
that "international private leased telecommunication[s] circuit[s] and
network service should continue to be made available in its present
form by Administrations and RPOAs."108 Of equal significance was
the group's conclusion that the Telegraph and Telephone Regula-
tions affimatively require the provision of leased channel service.'0 9
Any determination of a proper rate structure for such service, the
working party suggested, would require further study. 10 Another
event which transpired prior to the Commission's consideration of
108. CCITT Study Group III, Report on the Meeting Held in Geneva From 1 to 3
May, 1978, Doc. COM III-No. 51-E, at 4 (July 1978) (Working Party III/1).
109. Id. 1 1.1.2. See Final Acts of the World Administrative Telegraph and Tele-
phone Conference (Geneva 1973), 28 U.S.T. 3296, T.I.A.S. No. 8586; note 72 supra and
accompanying text.
110. See CCITT Study Group III, supra note 108, at 10. The Working Party consid-
ered Contributions No. 6 (Italy), No. 30 (Cable and Wireless), No. 35 (United States),
No. 38 (United States), No. 39 (IATA), No. 40 (IATA), No. 41 (Canada), and Delayed
Contribution A (IPCT). The issue of the proper price structure for leased channel cir-
cuits will be studied until the next plenary session of the CCITT. During this period,
European PTTs will gain experience with the utility of pricing mechanisms as a means of
controlling the flow of data across their national borders. As recognized by Mario
Benedetti, Chairman of the Eurodata Foundation:
When users have technically feasible alternatives, the major role in deciding the
distribution of the market between them is played by tariffs; in calculating the
price substitution elasticity between different networks, PITs will be able in [the]
future to figure the best structure and level of tariffs for the new data networks.
Benedetti, 4 Million Europeans Use Data Transmission Every Weekday, reprinted in 3
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP., No. 5 at 9, 11 1980. Through the experimental use of tariffs,
the Italian Administration has encouraged Italian newspapers to use the telecommunica-
tions network to print, through the use of highspeed facsimile devices, simultaneous edi-
tions in different cities from originals produced at the head office. The Italian tariff
allows the newspapers to lease circuits for only a few hours each night during off-peak
times at a fraction of the cost of full time usage. Id.
Other mechanisms that will become increasingly popular include the use of communi-
cations rates based on the gold franc and requiring payment in local currency. See COM-
PUTERWOpRLD, Oct. 27, 1980, at 101. It can also be expected that efforts will be made to
remove a major, if not the only, stumbling block to the introduction of private lines that
are priced on a usage-sensitive basis. Currently, no equipment exists that can distinguish
between administrative and control traffic that the PTT itself sends and mixes with a
user's traffic. The development of equipment or software that can accurately count and
levy a charge on the amount of data that a user transmits would allow pricing of private
lines on a usage-sensitive basis.
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ADAPSO's petition was Cable and Wireless' unexplained decision
to provide the requested private line circuit to GE.
The record does not reflect whether any of these matters entered
the Commission's decisionmaking process. Whether or not they did,
the dispute had become moot. Events in the international arena
indicated that private line service would not be eliminated, although
it might be made subject to usage-sensitive pricing. In the face of
these developments, the Commission issued a decision that author-
ized the three IRCs to initiate their data services between the United
States and Hong Kong.1"
Rather than articulate an approach that either took cognizance
of recent events or spoke with precision of the difficulties involved in
regulating international communications, the Commission took an
extremely restrictive view of its public interest responsibilities.
Though ostensibly sharing ADAPSO's concerns with respect to the
continued availability of private line service, the Commission inex-
plicably volunteered that it would not, and could not, compel foreign
administrations to provide such service or any other service that the
Commission reqcfires United States carriers to provide.1 2 Without
any apparent reason, the Commission completely discounted the lev-
erage it could exert over foreign correspondents by regulating the
operations of the carriers subject to its jurisdiction.' 13 The Commir-
sion's reluctance to impose the conditions proposed by ADAPSO
was even more surprising given its finding that the proposed condi-
tions would not impose any significant burden on the carriers.114
The Commission's order also appeared to limit the application
of section 214(c) of the Communications Act, which requires Com-
mission approval before a carrier may reduce, impair, or discontinue
111. ITT World Communications Inc., Western Union Int'l, Inc., RCA Global Com-
munications, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2664-2, I-T-C-2658-2, I-T-C-2657-3 (released
July 12, 1978) (Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Authorization) [hereinafter cited as
Hong Kong Order]. The Chief of the Commission's Common Carrier Bureau, acting
upon delegated authority, issued the order. Id. at 13.
112. The Commission stated that it could not "force foreign correspondents to provide
matching halves of particular circuits, or services which we require the U.S. carriers to
provide now, or in the future." Id. at 11.
113. The Commission's reluctance to impose any burden on the three carriers
appeared to be a departure from earlier decisions in which the Commission imposed
burdens on United States carriers in order to enforce the provisions of the Communica-
tions Act. See American Tel. & TeL Co., 57 F.C.C.2d 1103, 1107 (1976) ("[W]e cannot as
a matter of law accept the implicit assumption that our jurisdiction over a carrier's
charges for international services is somehow dependent upon the agreement of its for-
eign correspondents."); RCA Global Communications, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 616, 617 (1973)
("While we do not have jurisdiction over the foreign entities involved in this offering, we
do have jurisdiction over the manner in which our carriers participate in it, just as we do
with respect to any delivery practice or communications facility used to effectuate
delivery.").
114. See Hong Kong Order, supra note 111, at 12.
TELECOMMUNIC.ATIONS REGULATIONS
service, to the unequivocal and unambiguous acts of carriers subject
to its jurisdiction.' 5 In this regard, the Commission made it clear
that it would not examine evidence that a foreign PTT had denied
service, either with or without the encouragement or complicity of its
United States correspondent. Apparently content to limit its review
to the narrow facts before it, the Commission concluded that "[a]
controversy between [Cable and Wireless] and a private entity over
the provision of one private line circuit. . . does not. . . evidence
any intent on the part of either the IRC or the foreign entities to
discontinue generally flat rate, private line service." 116
D. JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL CARRIER CONDITIONS SERVICE
While the Hong Kong dispute was still pending before the
Commission, Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd. (KDD), Japan's
international carrier, was pursuing a course somewhat different than
the one taken by Cable and Wireless. Since the beginning of 1976,
two United States data processing companies, Control Data Corpo-
ration and Tymshare, Inc., had sought leased channel service from
KDD between the United States and Japan. Rather than flatly
refusing to provide service, as Cable and Wireless had done, KDD
engaged in a process of red tape and delay. 117 Only after a year and
a half had transpired"" did KDD act upon the two companies'
requests. When KDD did make the requested circuits available,
however, the lines were subject to a number of restrictive conditions.
In the case of Tymshare, KDD insisted that the requested cir-
cuit be connected only to certain specified computer systems at one
specific computer center in the United States.'1 9 In addition, KDD
demanded that the circuit not be connected to any public network in
the United States, including that of Tymnet, Inc., an affiliate of Tym-
115. Id. at 11-12.
116. Id. at 12 n.7.
117. See notes 119-25 infra and accompanying text.
118. This delay was in marked contrast to the speed with which the Japanese govern-
ment approved a joint venture between Tymshare and its Japanese affiliate. Misled by
this swift action, Tymshare's affiliate hired staff, rented office space, and made long-term
financial commitments. Virtually all of the affiliates start-up capital was gone by the
time KDD acted on Tymshare's request for service.
During this year and a half period, several significant events took place. The Italian
Administration introduced Contribution No. 6 to CCITT Study Group III; Cable and
Wireless denied private line service to GE; and Cable and Wireless and the United States
submitted their contributions to the CCITT Study Group III. See generally notes 71-85
& 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
119. See Petition to Deny of Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc.,
F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2678-1, I-T-C-2657-8, I-T-C-2664-1 I, at 6 (filed April 11, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Japan)].
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share.120 Finally, KDD demanded that Tymshare's Japanese affili-
ate discuss the use of KDD's new public data communications
service,12' when that service became available, in lieu of private line
service.122 Confronted with the choice of acceding to KDD's
demands or of not providing data processing services in Japan via
the requested circuit, Tymshare and its Japanese affiliate agreed to
KDD's conditions.' 23
Control Data's experience with KDD was similar to that of
Tymshare. KDD demanded that Control Data's leased circuit be
connected to a single computer system in a single location within the
United States.124 In addition, KDD demanded that when its new
data service became available, Control Data "respond .to ...
[KDD's] consultation with a premise of transfer to this service."' 2
These restrictions effectively prevented Tymshare and Control
Data from marketing their full line of data processing services in
Japan. To maintain as secure an environment as possible for their
customers' data and to assure the continuous reliability of their serv-
ices, Tymshare, Control Data, and most remote access data proces-
sors allocate responsibility for their data processing services among a
number of computer centers in various geographic locations. 26 The
data processing network moves data between customer terminals
and various computer centers, depending on the application
involved. Because primary processing capability for specific applica-
tions lies with specific processing centers, the only services that Tym-
share and Control Data could offer in Japan were those that were
processed on the systems connected to the ends of their transpacific
circuits.127
120. See 1d. The alleged purpose of these restrictions was to prevent message switch-
ing by Tymshare in violation of Japanese law. See, eg., Opposition of Western Union
Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2678-1, I-T-C-2657-8, I-T-C-2664-1, at 14-18 (filed
May 2, 1979). The U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administration
investigated the legitimacy of these restrictions under Japanese law. See Letter from
Masaaki Kobayashi, Embassy of Japan, to Edward Greenberg, National Telecommuni-
cations and Information Administration (July 17, 1980).
121. This new service, International Computer Access Service (ICAS) was not yet
available when KDD conditionally provided Tymshare the requested private line circuit.
See note 132 infra.
122. See ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Japan), supra note 119, at 6.
123. See id. On March 22, 1978, 16 months after Tymshare had initially requested the
circuit, service was inaugurated.
124. See id. at 8; note 120 supra.
125. See ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Japan), supra note 119, Appendix H, Attach-
ment B, at 2 (Memorandum of Sept. 14, 1977).
126. See id. at 7, 8; Application for Review of the Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2678-1, I-T-C-2657-8, I-T-C-2664-11, at 3
(filed Jan. 14, 1980) [hereinafter ADAPSO Application for Review].
127. ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Japan), supra note 119, at 7-9; ADAPSO Application
for Review, supra note 126, at 3.
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As was the case with the dispute that had arisen out of Cable
and Wireless' action in Hong Kong, there was no effective mecha-
nism to bring KDD's actions to the immediate attention of the Com-
mission.' 28 Lacking an effective administrative remedy, Tymshare
and Control Data pursued relief in other quarters. Representatives
of Tymshare and Control Data attempted to negotiate the removal
of KDD's restrictive conditions with the Embassy of Japan, the Jap-
anese delegation to CCITT, and the IRCs that provided private line
service in conjunction with KDD. The two data processors also
solicited the assistance of the United States-Japan Trade Facilitation
Committee129 and the United States Trade Representative. 30
None of these efforts, however, had produced any measurable
level of success when RCA, ITT, WUI, and KDD were ready to
inaugurate public data service between the United States and Japan.
In applications essentially identical to those that the IRCs had
presented to the Commission in the Hong Kong dispute, 131 the three
carriers requested section 214 operating authority for their usage-
sensitive public data services. 132 It was not until that time, after
128. See note 93 supra. The Communications Act of 1934 permits any person to file a
complaint alleging a violation of the Act with either the Commission or a federal district
court. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 206-209 (1976). For a description of the procedures used in
filing such complaints with the Commission, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.722-.735 (1980). This
complaint procedure, however, is limited to "any common carrier subject to the provi-
sions of [the Communications] Act." See 47 U.S.C. §§ 207, 208 (1976). Therefore, a
valid complaint cannot be filed directly against the foreign correspondent of a United
States international record carrier. Although a complaint could be filed against a United
States carrier in response to the unlawful conduct of its foreign correspondent, this would
be largely ineffectual in deterring the complained-of conduct.
129. The Joint United States-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee was established in
September 1977 to encourage increased Japanese imports through cooperation in trade
development activities and in the resolution of market access problems. See 43 Fed. Reg.
23,628 (1978).
130. The United States Trade Representative is the chief representative of the United
States for trade negotiations and reports directly to the President and to Congress. He is
responsible for the administration of certain trade agreement programs and advises the
President and Congress with respect to non-tariff barriers to international trade, interna-
tional commodity agreements, and other matters related to trade agreement programs.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (Supp. III 1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980),
reprintedin 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (Supp. III 1979). The Trade Representative has prepared
and continues to revise a list of selected impediments to trade in services. See, e.g., 4
TRANsNAt'L DATA REP., No. 5, at 49-55 (1981); 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA Rm,., No. 1, at 21-
23 (1980).
The United States-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee and the United States Trade
Representative were ultimately persuaded to use their influence to seek the removal of
the KDD-imposed conditions. See note 144 infra.
131. See generally notes 86-116 supra and accompanying text.
132. See Application of RCA Global Communications, Inc., F.C.C. File No. I-T-C-
2657-8 (filed Feb. 23, 1979); Application of ITT World Communications Inc., F.C.C. File
No. I-T-C-2664-11 (filed Feb. 22, 1979); Application of Western Union Int'l, Inc., F.C.C.
File No. I-T-C-2678-1 (filed Feb. 15, 1979). KDD labeled this new service ICAS. ICAS
is an international data transmission service for on-line information retrieval and other
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nearly a year of operation under KDD's restrictive conditions, and
more than three years after they had first requested service, that
Control Data and Tymshare had an opportunity to present their
grievances to the Commission.
On April 11, 1979, Control Data and ADAPSO petitioned the
Commission to deny the three carriers' applications.133 In doing so,
they squarely confronted the Commission, as it never had been
before, with the issues whether it could: (1) approve, consistent with
public interest, the inauguration of services that would assure the
maintenance of non-tariff trade barriers against American data
processors; (2) permit international and domestic telecommunica-
tions facilities to be used inefficiently; (3) sanction extraterritorial
restrictions on the use of private leased circuits that completely con-
flicted with section 203 of the Communications Act and the United
States' position before the CCITT; and (4) encourage the continued
imposition of restrictions on American companies using facilities in
the United States that the United States did not impose on Japanese
citizens and companies using facilities in Japan.134 The manner in
which the petiti6ners framed the issues seemed to compel the Com-
mission to decide whether the public interest standard embodied in
section 214 of the Communications Act was broad enough to encom-
pass concerns of international trade, international telecommunica-
tions policy, and international reciprocity. 135
purposes. It enables users to directly access host computers in foreign countries from
their own data terminals.
133. See ADAPSO Petition to Deny (Japan), note 119 supra; Petition to Deny of Con-
trol Data Corp., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2678-1, I-T-C-2664-1 1, I-T-C-2657-5 (filed April
11, 1979). CBEMA filed comments in which it urged the Commission to condition its
approval of the carriers' applications upon "the applicants' not discontinuing impairing
or curtailing flat rate leased channel service between the United States and Japan."
Comments of Computer & Business Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2678-1,
I-T-C-2664-11, I-T-C-2657-8, at 8 (filed April 11, 1979). In the alternative, CBEMA
asked the Commission to deny the carrier applications until such time as it was satisfied
that the grant of authority would not result in the discontinuance of leased channel serv-
ice. See id. at 8-9.
134. See ADAPSO Application for Review, supra note 126 at 7.
135. Section 214's public interest standard is applicable to both domestic and interna-
tional communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); Policy to be Followed in Future
Licensing of Facilities for Overseas Communications, 62 F.C.C.2d 451, 452 (1976).
Although the carriers disputed ADAPSO's interpretation of the public interest test, none
of the carriers challenged the otherwise sweeping nature of "the public convenience and
necessity" criterion. The importance of that criterion has been long-recognized:
The basic charter of the Commission is, of course, to act in the public interest. It
grants or denied licenses as the public interest, convenience and necessity dictate.
Whateverfactual elements make up that criterion in any given problem--and the
problem may differ factually from case to case-must be considered Such is not
only the power but the duty of the Commission.
Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Pocket Phone Broadcast Serv. Inc. v. FCC, 538 F.2d 447,451 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
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Notwithstanding the importance of the issues, the Commission's
Common Carrier Bureau, acting on delegated authority,1 36 issued a
decision granting the carriers' applications 37 that managed to side-
step every key issue. The order found "no persuasive evidence" that
KDD's actions impaired private line service.1 38 The Bureau also
concluded that KDD's failure to observe CCITT Recommendations
concerning the use of private lines was of no decisional significance,
because the Recommendations "are not binding on the Commission,
the IRC's, or other Administrations."' 139 Unmentioned was the
inconsistency of the KDD restrictions with the United States' free
trade policy' 40 and the position espoused by the United States before
the CCITT.' 4' Also absent from the staff's decision was any refer-
ence to the principle of "international reciprocity" that had been
recently affirmed by the Commission in another proceeding.1 42
ADAPSO appealed the Bureau's order to the full Commis-
sion.' 43 At that time, the Trade Facilitation Committee, the Depart-
ment of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative
renewed their efforts to negotiate the removal of KDD restric-
Network Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
136. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.291 (1979).
137. ITT World Communications Inc., RCA Global Communications, Inc., Western
Union Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2664-1 1, I-T-C-2657-8, I-T-C-2678-1 (released
Dec. 14, 1979) (Memorandum Opinion, Order, Authorization, and Certificate) [hereinaf-
ter cited as KDD Order].
138. Id. at 6. The order did not even discuss the signsificant limitations on the use of
private line service that had been in effect for well over a year. It therefore did not reach
the question whether the KDD-imposed restrictions constituted an impairment of service
that required Commission approval. Cf. ITT World Communications Inc. v. New York
TeL Co., 381 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (change in the characteristics of service is an
impairment requiring section 214 authorization by the Commission).
139. KDD Order, supra note 137, at 6.
140. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); Address by D.P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to
United Nations, before U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 1, 1975, text prepared by Henry
Kissinger), reprinted in 73 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 425, 433-38 (1975).
Mr. Geza Feketekuty, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Policy Development,
recently stated in hearings before Congress that many times governments exert control
over access to communications within their boundaries for commercial reasons, and fre-
quently "these commercial reasons involve pure protectionism of a very old kind." Inter-
national .Data Flow: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Government Information and
Individual Rights of the House Comm on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
489 (1980).
141. The United States CCITT delegation has consistently stressed the importance of
the continued availability of private line circuits. See notes 81-85 supra and accompany-
ing text.
142. See French Tel. Cable Co., 71 F.C.C.2d 393, 403-05 (1979). See also notes 159-
71 infra and accompanying text.
143. ADAPSO Application for Review, note 126 supra; see 47 C.F.R. § 1.115 (1980).
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tions.144 Congress was also apprised, through testimony before con-
cerned committees, of the effect of the restrictions on United States
commerce, as well as of the inability of both government and indus-
try to have the restrictions removed. 145 The Department of Com-
merce offered to brief the Commission on the wider trade
implications of the KDD restrictions.1'4 Although the Commission
formally accepted this offer, 47 a briefing never took place. Despite
the Department of Commerce's clear expression of interest in the
dispute, the Commission apparently concluded that a briefing with
the Department was either unnecessary or inappropriate, since it
proceeded to schedule consideration of ADAPSO's appeal of the
Bureau's decision. 48 Had the Commission awaited a briefing by the
Department of Commerce, it would have learned that negotiations
144. In May 1980, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative received notice that
ADAPSO was prepared to invoke an elaborate statutory remedy aimed at ultimately
removing the Japanese restrictions if negotiations proved unsuccessful See Letter from
Herbert E. Marks, Counsel to ADAPSO, to the Honorable Reubin O'D. Askew, U.S.
Trade Representative (May 12, 1980) (on file at Cornell InternationalLaw Journal). The
Trade Act of 1979 requires the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to follow an
extensive administative process, culminating in review by the President, if a party files a
formal complaint with respect to foreign trade restrictions. See 19 U.S.C.A §§ 2411-2414
(Wesi 1980). No party has ever used this procedure, however, to challenge a barrier to
commerce in services.
145. See International Data How: Hearings Before the Subcomtr on Government
Information and Individual Rights of the House Comm on Government Operations, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16-24, 61-64 (1980) (statements of Hugh P. Donaghue & Warren E. Bur-
ton); Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 611 and S. 622
Before the Subcomm. on Communications ofthe Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1427 (1979) (statement of Stephen H. Beach).
146. See Letter from Abraham Katz, Assistant Secretary for International Economic
Policy, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, and Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary for Telecommu-
nications and Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Charles D. Ferris, Chairman,
Federal Communications Commission (April 16, 1980) (on file at Cornell International
Law Journal). Congress sharply critized the belated involvement of the Department of
Commerce:
Whatever the failings of the FCC, however, executive branch actions are equally
open to criticism. One letter offering a briefing is a less than compelling inter-
vention. Given the scope and complexity of the foreign policy and telecommuni-
cations policy questions involved, more substantial official communications by
the executive agencies were in order. NTIA, for example, has fied voluminous
comments in other FCC proceedings. The State Department's apparent caution
was also unfortunate. While some delicate matters of foreign policy may have
been involved, most of the issues and concerns were public and clearcut.
Finally, in this essentially trade problem, where was the United States Trade
Representative?
H.R. RP. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1980).
147. See Letter from Charles D. Ferris, Chairman, Federal Communications Com-
mission, to Abraham Katz, Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, and Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary for Telecommunications and
Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (May 12, 1980) (on file at Cornell International
Law Journal); Letter from Richard A. Johnson, Associate General Counsel for Interna-
tional Trade, Dep't of Commerce, to Robert R. Bruce, General Counsel, Federal Com-
munications Commission (July 3, 1980) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
148. See FCC Pub. Notice No. 28151 (Sept. 26, 1980).
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between the United States and Japan were nearing fruition.
Although it was abundantly clear from the outset that any Commis-
sion action would threaten the success of these negotiations, the mat-
ter was withdrawn from the Commission's agenda only at the last
moment. 149
Three months after the Commission had scheduled action on
the KDD appeal, Japan's Minister of Posts and Telecoramunications
"authorized" KDD to negotiate the removal of the restrictions that it
had imposed on the use of leased lines. °50 Although the Commission
subsequently made efforts not to disturb these negotiations, 51 they
proved to be only partially successful. As of this writing, KDD has
refused to remove the last of the offending conditions. As with the
Hong Kong dispute, events independent of the Commssion led to
removal of the barriers that had obstructed the free flow of
information.
E. THE WEST GERMAN BUNDESPOST REGULATIONS
In December 1978, the German Federal Ministry for Posts and
Telecommunications (Bundespost) promulgated regulations that
dramatically circumscribed the use which could be made of interna-
tional leased channel circuits by foreign remote access data proces-
sors wishing to do business in Germany.' 52 Specifically, the
Bundespost regulations, which will become fully effective January 1,
1982, require all leased lines entering Germany to be "hardwired" to
a single terminal device that is not connected to any other communi-
cations network in Germany, or to terminate in a computer in Ger-
many that performs "true" data processing on the data
transmitted. 5 3 If the latter condition is satisfied, the leased line may
149. See FCC Pub. Notice No. 00081 (Oct. 2, 1980).
150. See Telegram from U.S. Department of State, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan,
to Department of Commerce (Dec. 29, 1980) (on file at Cornell International Law Jour-
nal). "After rewriting their current contracts with KDD, American timesharing compa-
nies may begin offering their Japanese customers access to multiple computer processing
centers located in the U.S. using international telecommunication access lines they lease
from KDD." Id. See also KDD 91-l Junk Rule on Int'l Data Service, JAPAN EcoN. J.,
Nov. 4, 1980 (Global Information Services, Inc. trans.); Bus. WFEK, Dec. 15, 1980, at 40.
151. See, ew, ITT World Communications Inc., RCA Global Communications, Inc.,
Western Union Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C-2664-1 I, I-T-C-2657-8, I-T-C-2678-I
(released Oct. 21, 1981) (Order and Authorization).
152. See Telegram from American Embassy, Bonn, West Germany, to U.S. Secretary
of State 3 (April 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Telegram] (on file at Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal). The regulations were amended in April 1979. Id.
153. Id. The State Department offered its own unofficial translation of the
regulations:
6.3 Indirect Access Via Computer Equipment
International leased lines, upon application by the lessees, may be permitted
indirect access via data terminals to the main lines (main stations capable of
direct dialing) of the Deutsche Bundespost-which may have neither direct nor
1981]
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access the public networks operated by the Bundespost. As a result
of these restrictions on the use of leased circuits, United States
remote access data processors cannot do business in Germany unless
they perform data processing there. This requirement that data
processing be performed in Germany, however, would defeat many
of the economic and technical advantages of operating a worldwide
distributed data processing network.
In both purpose and effect, the Bundespost regulations are non-
tariff barriers to trade. The regulations not only protect West Ger-
many's data processing services industry (and the jobs that it pro-
vides), but they also assure that the Bundespost will derive higher
revenues. Foreign data processors that are not prepared to locate
some or all of their processing operations in Germany will be
required to transfer their transatlantic and other international traffic
to more expensive usage-sensitive services. Indeed, one of the admit-
ted goals of the new regulations is to shift all data traffic to the
Bundespost's usage-sensitive services-both domestic and
international.154
When the bundespost regulations come into full effect, they will
undoubtedly reduce the amount of unprocessed data that now tran-
sits the Atlantic Ocean. Their effect on United States data processors
will thus be similar to the restrictions KDD imposed on the use of
private lines.155 The German Bundespost has itself recognized the
dramatic impact that the new regulations will have on commerce.
The Bundespost has conducted extensive discussions with affected
indirect access to the main telephone or data transmission lines (once again,
main stations) insofar as these lines are part of a remote data processing system
and it is assured that no unprocessed data can reach the public telecommunica-
tions network on the other side of the international leased line. However, only
the main line (main station) of the lessee of the international leased line may be
connected via digital leased lines for transmission speeds of more than two hun-
dred bits per second and via the approved indirect access to the main lines (main
station) network. After January 1, 1982, main lines .will specifically only be per-
mitted access to telephone or datex main lines (main stations, leased or foreign)
as well as telephone, datex and telex main lines (main stations) of the Deutsche
Bundespost via data processing equipment upon application of the lessee accord-
ing to the above mentioned conditions. All indirect access of international
leased lines via data concentrators (or other data equipment that does not pro-
cess data) to such main lines of the public telephone network of the Deutsche
Bundespost, which are already operating or will begin operating through 1981,
can continue only until December 31, 1981.
Id.
154. Id. 6.
155. Like the KDD restrictions, the Bundespost regulations are extraterritorial in
effect, since they limit the use which can be made of leased channel circuits both within
and without Germany. The Bundespost regulations, however, at least purport to operate
solely on the German terminus of a leased channel circuit. For a discussion of the legiti-
macy of the Bundespost regulations under the Treaty of Rome, see Ramsey, supra note 2,
at 281-82.
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companies and a variety of arrangements, including waivers, have
been made to allow the companies to continue to operate in Ger-
many, albeit on somewhat altered bases. 156
One probable effect of the Bundespost's efforts to negotiate the
application of the new regulations to data processors will be to limit
the incentive that users might otherwise have to lodge a formal com-
plaint against Germany with the United States Trade Representative
or, if the opportunity should present itself, with the Commission. 57
Absent some reason for the IRCs serving Germany to come before
the Commission for additional authority to serve that country, the
opportunities for effective regulatory relief are minimal. 58 Any
invocation of the Commission's processes at the present time might
be considered premature, however, since the Bundespost regulations
will not take effect until 1982. Moreover, there is always the risk that
the Commission might decline, as it has in the past, to take effective
action to eliminate the restrictive effects of these regulations.
The same is true of the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative. Although the Trade Representative might initiate negotia-
tions or lodge a complaint at the request of an individual data
processor, such negotiations might be abandoned in return for trade
concessions in non-telecommunications areas. Consequently, users
would be generally disinclined to initiate a dispute that they could
not ultimately control, particularly if such action might jeopardize a
more favorable negotiated settlement with the Bundespost.
156. See Telegram, note 152 supra.
157. One commentator has suggested that users are generally reluctant to lodge com-
plaints against a PTT
for fear of the impact which any reprisals by a PIT, or group of PTTs, would
have on their business operations and on their revenues.
Of course, any director general of a PTT would be horrified at the suggestion
that his or her organization might retaliate against a complainant-but if one
knows the labyrinthine workings of a typical European PIT, one also knows that
there are a multitude of subtle ways in which a major corporation's international
telecommunication operations could be hindered, harassed or otherwise dis-
rupted without any obvious or overt sign, of retaliation.
TELEPHONY, Jan. 26, 1981, at 73.
158. A similar situation was presented when two United States vendors of data bases
were excluded from Euronet-a European communications network-because they used
computers located outside of Europe. Neither vendor had any recourse under the
existing provisions of the Communications Act. See But UIS Data Base Vendors
Excldaed, 4 TRANSNAt'L DATA REP., No. 3, at 6 (1981). For a discussion of Euronet's
planned role in the development of a European information services market, see Ram-
sey, supra note 2, at 258-59.
19811
320 CORNELL INTERNA5TIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:287
III
INTERNATIONAL RECIPROCITY AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
For a brief period of time in 1979, while the KDD dispute was
pending before the Commission's Common Carrier Bureau, it
appeared as if the Commission was about to embark upon a course
that would give users confidence that the Commission would not tol-
erate economic protectionism in international telecommunications.
The occasion involved a request by French Telegraph Cable Com-
pany (FTCC), an international record carrier, for authority to estab-
lish and operate "gateway" offices in San Francisco, California and
in Washington, D.C.159 TRT Telecommunications Corporation
(TRT), a competing IRC, opposed FTCC's application.' 60 TRT
urged the Commission to deny FTCC's application since FTCC was
"a foreign corporation, owned and controlled by French nationals
with apparently strong ties to the French government and its com-
munications entity, the French PTT."161 TRT claimed that it would
be unfair to accord FTCC additional operating privileges in the
United States while the French PTT denied similar operating rights
to TRT and to other American carriers.' 62
In an unprecedented decision, the Commission denied FTCC's
application. It did so on the basis of what the Commission described
as a longstanding-though little known-reciprocity policy.1 63 Not-
ing that reciprocity was first enunciated by President Grant in 1869
and reaffirmed by Congress in the Submarine Cable Landing
159. See French Tel. Cable Co., 71 F.C.C.2d 393 (1979). A "gateway" is a city that
constitutes a point of entry into or exit from the continental United States, where the
IRCs may pick up and deliver messages that either originate or terminate at a point
outside the continental United States. The concept of a gateway, although today a prod-
uct of section 222(a)(5) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 222(a)(5) (1976), pre-
dates the passage of the Act. Before 1934, a gateway was the location of the IRCs' offices
and the point at which they interconnected with domestic carriers. The locations of the
initial gateway cities were determined by the physical termini of overseas transmission
facilities and the fact that the IRCs had commercial operations in those cities. See
French Tel. Cable Co., 71 F.C.C.2d at 394.
160. See French Tel. Cable Co., 71 F.C.C.2d at 394.
161. Id. at 397.
162. See id. at 397-98. New carriers have historically had difficulties obtaining operat-
ing agreements with foreign PTTs. See Int'l Relay,.nc., 77 F.C.C.2d 819, 827 (1980).
See also Grapbnet Sys., Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 402 (1977), recon. denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 1020
(1978), agd in part & remanded sub nom. ITT World Communications Inc. v. FCC, 595
F.2d 897, 911 (2d Cir.), on remand, 71 F.C.C.2d 1066 (1979), recon. granted, Mimeo No.
25984 (released Feb. 4, 1980), also Mimeo No. 30890 (released April 3, 1980) (authoriza-
tion of Graphnet to enter international market, despite lack of operating agreement, with
resulting inability of Graphnet to commence operations).
163. See French Tel. Cable Co., 71 F.C.C.2d at 403-05.
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License Act of 1921,164 the Commission made it clear that reciprocity
was still a vital United States policy. Finding that no United States
IRC had been allowed to maintain an office in France since 1958,
the Commission concluded that a grant of authority to FTCC would
conflict with this nation's policy of reciprocity and would, therefore,
be inconsistent with the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity.165 In a concurring statement, Commissioner Joseph Fogarty
urged the Commission to take more drastic action to demonstrate
the importance of the reciprocity policy. He proposed that the Com-
mission schedule a hearing to consider the revocation of all of
FTCC's extant operating authority. 66
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Commission's deci-
sion was its expansive view of its public interest responsibilities. In
weighing the public interest, the Commission took into consideration
the executive and congressional policy of reciprocity-a policy not
expressly articulated in the Communications Act. The implications
of the Commission's analysis for its future treatment of non-tariff
telecommunications barriers were enormous. Although there clearly
would be limitations on the degree to which policies of reciprocity
and free commerce in telecommunications would be controlling ele-
ments of the statutory public interest test, 67 the decision indicated
that the Commission would use its discretion to weigh such policies
in appropriate cases.
The Commission, however, began to back away from its state-
ments in the FTCC case almost as soon as the decision was pub-
lished. When FTCC petitioned the Commission for additional
facilities to serve existing gateways, the Commission did not consider
164. President Grant had refused to issue a submarine cable landing license to French
Cable until it "renounced its exclusive rights in France so that U.S. carriers could be
accorded the privilege of landing cables on French soil." Id. at 401. See Submarine
Cable Landing License Act of 1921, 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-39 (1976); Exec. Order No. 10,530
(1954) reprinted h 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). The Commission still grants cable landing
licenses under the provisions of the Submarine Cable Landing License Act. See, ag.,
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 957 (1967); American Tel. & Tel Co., 34 F.C.C.2d
132 (1972); American Tel. & Tel. Co., 35 F.C.C.2d 803 (1972).
165. See French Tel. Cable Co., 71 F.C.C.2d at 404-05.
166. Id. at 406. In another proceeding, Commissioner Fogarty joined the Commis-
sion in authorizing a seventh transatlantic cable (TAT), but emphasized the importance
of reciprocity. Commissioner Fogarty argued that because the Commission has
"deferred to -the policies and expressed needs of the foreign governments, we should
expect 'tit for TAT" from the Europeans in terms of their recognition of our competitive
policies and their agreement to deal with our multiplicity of carriers." Overseas Commu-
nications, 71 F.C.C.2d 71, 99 (1979).
167. Cf. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953) (Commission's
order vacated on grounds that, although "competition is a relevant factor in weighing the
public interest," decision granting new transatlantic operating authority to international
carrier could not be based solely on "national policy in favor of competition.").
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reciprocity a bar.' 68 When FTCC proposed to transfer its assets
from the French government to United States corporations, only
Commissioner Fogarty resisted.' 69 In another case ripe for disposi-
tion on the grounds of reciprocity, the Commission declined to
impose restrictions on the foreign ownership of cable television sys-
tems in the United States. The Commission concluded that it did
not believe "a desire for reciprocity in international investment poli-
cies by itself provides an adequate basis for action on our part.' 70
In short, the Commission found that questions of international trade
were "more appropriately addressed to other branches of govern-
ment." 71 The Commission's apparent loss of interst in the principle
of reciprocity was soon followed by an apparent lack of interest in
the international ramifications of its own actions.
In the spring of 1980, the Commission issued a notice of
rulemaking that proposed the adoption of a policy that would pro-
hibit United States carriers from restricting the resale or shared use
of international telecommunications services and facilities. 17 2 The
adoption of such a policy would place, the United States in direct
conflict with thd, policy reflected in the CCITT Recommendations
that contain internationally accepted limitations on the use which
may be made of international leased channel circuits.' 73
Numerous parties commenting on the Commission's proposal
argued that unilateral adoption of the proposed rule could result in a
significant curtailment in the availability of flat-rate leased channel
circuits by foreign administrations opposed to resale and shared
168. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 F.C.C.2d 248 (1979).
169. In Commissioner Fogarty's view, the French government would profit from the
proposed transaction, the same as it would have if the Commission had granted FTCC's
initial request for additional gateways. See FTC Communications, Inc. 75 F.C.C.2d 15,
29-30 (1980) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Joseph R. Fogarty).
170. Foreign Ownership of CATV Systems, 77 F.C.C.2d 73, 78-79 (1980).
171. Id. at 81.
172. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier
Int'l Communications Servs., 77 F.C.C.2d 831 (1980) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
173. Paragraph 1.7 of Recommendation D.1 provides:
Within the limits fixed by Administrations in each case, private leased circuits
may be used only to exchange communications relating to the business of the
customer. When the circuit is used to route communications from (to) one or
more users other than the customer, these communications must be concerned
exclusively with the activity for which the circuit is leased.
CCITT ORANGE BooK, supra note 41, 11.7.
Paragraph 1.10 contains a more general limitation on the permissible uses of telecom-
munications facilities: "Administrations shall refuse to provide an international private
leased circuit when the customer's proposed activity would be regarded as an infringe-
ment of the functions of an Administration in providing telecommunications services to
others:' Id. 1 1.10. See also Letter from Leon Burtz, Director of CCITT, to Arthur
Freeman, Director, Office of Int'l Communications Policy, U.S. Dep't of State (June 20,
1980) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal.
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use.174 Were this to occur, a decade of work by the United States
CCITT delegation would be quickly undone. 75 Moreover, adoption
of the Commission's proposal would place the agency in conflict
with the position historically espoused by the United States CCITT
delegation. 176 Indeed, one of the delegation's most important Con-
tributions to CCITT outlined the reasons why foreign administra-
tions need not fear that leased channels would be improperly shared,
resold, or used for message switching. 177
The Commission's proposal seemed particularly inappropriate
for an agency that had previously articulated a need for interna-
tional reciprocity.178 Its apparent willingness to act in derogation of
an internationally accepted regulation stirred a great deal of contro-
174. See Comments of Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176 (filed
Aug. 14, 1980); Comments of Citicorp, F.C.C Docket No. 80-176 (filed Aug. 15, 1980);
Comments of Computer and Business Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at
6-8 (filed Aug. 15, 1980); Comments of Hawaiian Tel. Co., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at
3 (filed Aug. 15, 1980); Comments of Int'l Communications Ass'n, F.C.C. Docket No. 80-
176, at 17-18 (filed Aug. 7, 1980); Comments of ITT World Communications Inc., F.C.C.
Docket No. 80-176, at 30 (filed Aug. 18, 1980); Comments of RCA Global Communica-
tions, Inc., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at 3-4 (filed Aug. 15, 1980); Comments of TRT
Telecommunications Corp., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at 3-5 (filed Aug. 15, 1980); Com-
ments of Western Union Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at 1-4 (fied Aug. 15,
1980).
175. See notes 81-85 supra and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., CCITT Study Group III, note 85 supra; see note 85 supra and accompa-
nying text. The Chairman of the Commission attempted to explain the Commission's
action in an address to European telecommunications administrations:
Before I close, I want to comment upon the reaction to our resale proposal within
the CCITT. I need not reaffirm our commitment to CCITT: Our actions over
the years leave no doubt about that. But we have legal obligations to examine
our policies continuously and to adopt changes when it is in the public interest of
U.S. citizens to do so. In this case, harmonizing a CCITT recommendation is
not required before we first consider permitting resale of private lines. We recog-
nize that it may be necessary later to take the question up in CCITT because it
would do no practical good to authorize resale if none of our foreign correspon-
dents is willing to concur in our decision.
Statement of the Hon. Charles D. Ferris, at 5 (Oct. 30, 1980) (Madrid, Spain) (meeting of
representatives of United States, CEPT, and Teleglobe Canada) (on file at CornellInter-
national Law Journal). The Chairman's remarks, however, were made after the Com-
mission's proposal had received a great deal of criticism from within the CCITT and the
United States. See notes 179-81 infra and accompanying text.
177. See CCITT Study Group III, note 85 supra.
178. See notes 159-66 supra and accompanying text. The Commission's proposal also
seemed to mark a departure from its commitment to international cooperation with
respect to international facilities planning. See Overseas Communications, 67 F.C.C.2d
358, 408-19 (1980); Overseas Communications, 62 F.C.C.2d 451, 457 (1976) ("We recog-
nize, of course, that considerations of national sovereignty and international comity
require that no nation have a final unilateral determination with respect to facility
deployment and use."); Overseas Communications, 53 F.C.C.2d 121, 122 (1975) ("In car-
rying out our responsibilities regarding international communications we are keenly
mindful of the fact that the United States is a party of interest in a broad community of
many countries that also have concerns and responsibilities with regard to international
communications systems... ."); American TeL & Tel. Co., 35 F.C.C.2d 801, 818 (1972)
("We recognize international communications to be a mutual effort among telecommuni-
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versy both at home and abroad. 79 Leon Burtz, Director of the
CCITT, expressed a commonly held concern: "To implement at the
international level provisions which are at variande with the CCITT
Recommendations is tantamount to repudiating their validity and
purpose and at the same time sapping the moral authority of the
CCITT."' 80 A score of foreign administrations also expressd their
disapproval of the Commission's proposed rule.'8'
It is not surprising that a major theme that surfaced in the
responses to the Commission's notice of proposed rulemaking was
the need for a consistent and uniform United States telecommunica-
tions policy.'8 2 Indeed, the fact that the Commission even released
its proposal highlighted the potential for catastrophe inherent in the
diffusion of responsibility for telecommunications and information
cations entites of several nations, and require, by their nature, the utmost effort by those
concerned to cooperate in resolving differences of opinion and objections.").
179. See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Harley 0. Staggers, U.S. House of Representatives, to
Hon. Charles D. Ferris, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (July 21,
1980); Letter from Hon. Richardson Preyer, U.S.. House of Representatives, to Hon.
Charles D. Ferris, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (July 21, 1980); Let-
ter from Hon. Harley 0. Staggers, U.S. House of Representatives, to Matthew Nimitz,
Department of State (July 21, 1980); Letter from Hon. Richardson Preyer, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Matthew Nimitz, Department of State (July 21, 1980).
180. Letter from Leon Burtz to Arthur Freeman, supra note 173, at 3.
181. See Comments of ITT World Communications Inc., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176
(filed Aug. 15, 1980). ITT stated:
Many [administrations] simply say they will continue to follow CCITT Recom-
mendation D.1 (Chile, Columbia, Cyprus, India, Italy, Malaysia, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden). Others say that they do not and will not permit shared-use or
resale (Belgium, Brazil, Japan, South Africa, United Arab Emirates). Some
express concern about degradation of quality of service from loss of control over
the various network transitions and interface conditions (Austria, Switzerland,
United Arab Emirates). Great Britain suggests that "any major changes...
must necessarily be preceded by full discussions in ITU ... "' India and Sing-
apore concur in the need to address the question within the CCITT forum.
id. at 18-19.
182. In particular, there was strong sentiment that the Commission should first pursue
the development of a uniform national policy within the federal government and then
have appropriate representatives of the United States advance that policy-either bilater-
ally or in the context of CCITT. See Comments of Int'l Communications Ass'n, F.C.C.
Docket No. 80-176, at 15-17 (filed Aug. 7, 1980); Comments of Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at 10-11 (filed Aug. 15,
1980); Comments oflControl Data Corp., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at 4-5 (filed Aug.
15, 1980).
The comments of the International Communications Association, an association of
large users of communications services, aptly summarized the perceived problem:
While the FCC clearly has expertise in telecommunications regulatory matter8,"
there is some question as to whether it possesses sufficient statutory authority to
negotiate on behalf of the United States or its carriers. The State Department,
on the other hand, possesses authority and expertise in telecommunications.
NTIA is charged with Executive telecommunications policy development and
brings together expertise in the related fields of trade and information flow; how-
ever, like the FCC, it lacks specific authority to represent the United States in
international telecommunications negotiations. Therefore, some legislative relief
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policy within the United States government. The international
resale and shared use proceeding, however, was merely one example
of a problem that had previously arisen in other situations.183
may be required to establish workable procedures for the development and coor-
dination of United States telecommunications policy.
Comments of Int'l Communications Ass'n, F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, at 17 (filed Aug. 7,
1980). See Exec. Order No. 12,046, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,349 (1978).
183. The KDD dispute serves as a prime example of the lack of coordination within
the federal government. See notes 118-30 supra and accompanying text. A more direct
conflict between the Commission and the United States CCITT delegation manifested
itself at about the same time. In Contribution No. 38, the United States delegation to
CCITT attempted to stave off efforts to eliminate or re-tariff private line service by
stressing the restrictions that United States law placed on the use of such circuits. See
notes 128-50supra and accompanying text. The delegation argued that these restrictions,
together with private enforcement, assured that private networks would not be used to
divert traffic in an improper way from public networks.
In mid-1978, the Commission received complaints that Consortium Communications
International, Inc. (CCI) was violating these restrictions. See Complaint, ITT World
Communications, Inc. v. Consortium Communications Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. Docket No. 78-
759 (June 12, 1978); Complaint, RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. Consortium Com-
munications Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. File No. TS78-1945 (July 6, 1978). CCI offered an inter-
national service whereby users in the United States could use domestic telex or TWX to
call CCI's offices. This traffic would be collected by a CCI computer in New York that
directed the information to CCI's European office via a private line or the overseas voice
telephone network. In Europe, the traffic was delivered to the addressee through the use
of local telex services. CCI characterized its service offering as "information forward-
ing," "communications management," "data processing," and "hybrid data processing."
See Special Appearance to Answer Complaint, ITT World Communications, Inc. v.
Consortium Communications Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. TS 9-78, TS 10-78, at 2, 13-18
(Aug. 15, 1978). The complainants and ultimately the Commission said CCrs operations
constituted common carrier communications. The Commission, however, did not do so
until February 12, 1980-a year and a half after the complaints had been filed. See ITT
World Communications Inc. v. Consortium Communications Int'l, Inc., 76 F.C.C.2d 15
(1980).
In failing to act promptly on these complaints, the Commission seriously endangered
the position and credibility of the United States delegation to CCITT. Having finally
concluded that CCI was unlawfully engaged in the offering of communications common
carriage, the Commission interposed a further obstacle to the resolution of the CCI dis-
pute. In November 1980, before the initiation of the international resale and shared use
proceeding, but after the release of a decision in the Second Computer Inquiry, the Com-
mission unilaterally deferred action on CCI's then pending application for section 214
operating authority. The Commission stated that it was uncertain whether CCI's pro-
posed service offering was basic, which required Commission approval, or merely an
enhanced service, which did not. See Letter from William F. Adler, Chief, International
Facilities Authorization & Licensing Division, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, to Con-
sortium Communications Int'l, Inc. (Nov. 14, 1980) (Ref. No. 61100). See also notes 16-
19 supra and accompanying text.
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-IV
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION IN
REMOVING BARRIERS TO THE
TRANSBORDER FLOW OF
INFORMATION
Over the course of the last several years, users of international
communications services have witnessed the Commission at its
extremes. In the Hong Kong and KDD disputes, the Commission
demonstrated that it could remain oblivious to the most blatant
restrictions on the transborder flow of information. The Commis-
sion's inaction with respect to the West German Bundespost regula-
tions, although in a class by itself, also revealed a need for greater
agency initiative. In the FTCC proceeding, however, the Commis-
sion displayed an institutional willingness to pursue its statutory
public interest responsibilities aggressively. Whereas the KDD and
international resale and shared use proceedings revealed a lack of
coordination on the part of the Commission with other branches of
federal government, the Commission's role iM" the FTCC case sug-
gested otherwise.
Although informal efforts on the part of the agencies involved
in transborder dataflow issues to consult with one another might
alleviate some of the problems discussed above, the situation
demands a more comprehensive solution.18 4 Progress towards this
end is being made on a number of fronts. In hearings that Congress
has conducted over the last several years,185 representatives of pri-
vate industry reiterated their desire to see responsibility for telecom-
munications and information policy centralized within the federal
government. These efforts have resulted in the introduction of a
number of measures, two of which are now pending before Con-
gress, that propose a structural solution to the current diffusion of
responsibility within the federal bureaucracy.' 8 6
In addition to these efforts to provide some focus and purpose to
the development of national policy, other legislative initiatives have
been advanced to remedy the problem of a Commission that is
unwilling, or that views itself as unable, to secure the removal of
184. The agencies involved in telecommunications and information policy cannot
ignore the various Executive orders and statutes responsible for the diffusion of responsi-
bility among various agencies. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,046, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,349
(1978); 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1976).
185. See, e.g., International Data Flow: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government
Information and indinvidual Rights of the House Comnm on Government Operations, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). But see H.R. REP. No. 100, pt. 2, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
186. See H.R. 1957, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. REc. H532 (1981); S. 821, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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telecommunications barriers that restrict the transborder flow of
information187 Although no legislative proposal has suggested that
the Commission should have sole responsibility for developing tele-
communications policy and obtaining the removal of such restric-
tions, the Commission has been recognized to be particularly well-
situated to prevent the imposition and to secure the removal of pro-
tectionist measures that limit the use of international telecommuni-
cations facilities.' 88
The Commission's past inability to deal effectively with trans-
border dataflow disputes has, in part, been attributable to its inter-
pretation of section 214 of the Communications Act, which directs
the Commission to weigh the public convenience and necessity in
evaluating common carrier applications for authority to construct
new facilities and to inaugurate new services between the United
States and other countries. 89 Although the public interest standard
is broad enough to require the Commission to consider the restric-
tions foreign telecommunications administrations have imposed on
United States enterprises, 90 the Commission generally has not per-
ceived its responsibilites so expansively. Even if the Commission
were inclined to do so, section 214 provides, at best, a less-than-satis-
factory means to pursue the removal of conditions that restrict the
use which may be made of international telecommunications facili-
ties by United States enterprises--common carrier or otherwise. 191
187. See H.R. 4177, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); S. 898, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127
CONG. REC. S11443 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1981). A similar provision surfaced during the
last Congress as part of the ill-fated Telecommunications Act of 1980. See H.R. 6121,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6, 126 CONG. REc. 1-7859 (1980). Bills such as H.R. 1957 and S.
821 specifically do not apply to the rulemaking and adjudicatory functions of the Com-
mission. See, e.g., H.R. 1957, supra note 186, § 2(d).
Congressman Walgren recently introduced another measure implementing reciprocity,
but only with respect to cable television. See H.R. 4225, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
This bill would require the Commission to impose restrictions (including complete exclu-
sion) on foreign cable television systems and operators wishing to do business in the
United States that would be identical to the restrictions the foreign country in question
imposes on United States systems and operators.
188. In addition to requiring the Commission to assure reciprocity in international
communications, S. 898 would also require "[e]very final significant rule or order of the
Commission" to be accompanied by the Department of Commerce's analysis of the
action's effect on 'the ability of United States' industry to compete domestically and
abroad." S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 406 (1981).
189. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
190. See note 135 supra.
191. See note 93 supra and accompanying text. See also note 128 supra. The problem
presented by the West German Bundespost regulations is a prime example. Section 214
simply would not come into play unless a United States carrier sought authority to
undertake a new international offering in conjunction with the Bundespost. Absent some
deaf connection between the new offering and the restrictions on leased channel service,
the Commission might not be inclined to take any action. This was the case in the Hong
Kong and KDD disputes.
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Absent an aggressive Commission, legislation appears to be the
only sure means of remedying the situation. The proposals that
Congress has favored to date would direct and empower the Com-
mission to investigate and pursue the elimination of all transborder
dataflow restrictions involving the use of telecommunications facili-
ties.192 This would be done, without doing violence to international
192. Two examples of this approach include H.R. 4177, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
and S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 238 (1981). Of the two measures, H.R. 4177 is more
comprehensive in its treatment of the principle of reciprocity. Even H.R. 4177, however,
does not go as far as some parties would like. The Association of Data Processing Serv-
ice Organizations, for example, has proposed that the Commission not only be directed
to assure reciprocity generally, but that it be required to impose on foreign enterprises the
same or similar conditions as are placed on United States enterprises doing business
abroad. Since elements of the ADAPSO proposal appear in both S. 898 and H.R. 4177,
ADAPSO's proposed addition to section 152 of the Communications Act is worth quot-
ing in its entirety:
(c)(1) The Commission shall have authority, as provided herein, to assure that
the terms and conditions pursuant to which a foreign enterprise is permitted,
directly or in conjunction with a United States enterprise, to provide any tele-
communications or telecommunications-related service or pursuant to which a
foreign telecommunications or telecommunications-related service is permitted
entry, directly or in conjunction with a United States telecommunications or tele-
communications-related service, in any United States market are reciprocal with
the terms and conditions pursuant to which United States enterprises and United
States telecommunications and telecommunications-related services are permit-
ted entry into-
(A) the foreign nation in which the operations of such foreign telecommu-
nications or telecommunications-related service or such foreign enterprise
are based; or
(B) the foreign nation under the laws of which such foreign telecommuni-
cations or telecommunications-related service or such foreign enterprise is
established.
(2) In carrying out its responsibilities under paragraph (1), the Commission
shall have the authority to inquire into any charge, practice, classification,
requirement or provision of a service, facility, or product by any carrier in order
to determine if such charge, practice, classification, requirement, or provision of
a service, facility, or product is just and reasonable, promotes the public conven-
ience and necessity, and ensures the equitable treatment and competitive posi-
tion of United States enterprises in international markets.
(3) In carrying out its responsibilities under paragraphs (1) and (2), the Com-
mission shall have the authority to adopt, by order or rule, regulations, policies,
requirements, and procedures, and to restrict, condition, or prohibit the use of
services, facilities, and instrumentalities subject to its jurisdiction under this Act,
by a foreign telecommunications or telecommunications-related service, or by a
foreign enterprise, as the Commission determines to be necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this subsection; provided, however, that the Com-
mission shall, to the extent possible, impose the same restrictions upon a foreign
telecommunications or telecommunications-related service or foreign enterprise
as are imposed upon similar United States telecommunications or telecommuni-
cations-related services or upon similarly situated United States enterprises by-
(A) the foreign nation in which the operations of such foreign telecommu-
nications or telecommunications-related service or such foreign enterprise
are based; or
(B) the foreign nation under the laws of which such foreign telecommuni-
cations or telecommunications-related service or such foreign enterprise is
established.
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comity or the prerogative of the Executive, by statutorily endorsing
the principle of international reciprocity that the Commission once
favored.19 3 In short, these proposals would direct the Commission to
assure that the terms and conditions pursuant to which foreign enter-
prises and foreign telecommunications and telecommunications-
related services1 94 are permitted to use United States telecommuni-
(4)(A) In conducting any inquiry under paragraph (1), and before taking
action under paragraph (2), the Commission shall request and consider the views
of the Secretary of State and the United States Trade Representative.
(B) The President may, not later than 45 days after any final determina-
tion of the Commission regarding the imposition of reciprocal restrictions
upon a foreign enterprise or a foreign telecommunications or telecommuni-
cations-related service, veto such final determination if the President deter-
mines that such final determination will injure the foreign policy interests of
the United States.
(C) If the President decides to take any action under this paragraph, he
shall publish notice of his determination, including the reasons for the deter-
mination, in the Federal Register. Unless he determines that expeditious
action is required, the President shall provide an opportunity for the presen-
tation of views concerning the taking of such action.
(5) For purposes of this subsection:
(A) The term "foreign enterprise" means any common carrier, person or
organization which is-
(i) an alien or the representative of an alien;
(ii) a foreign government or representative of a foreign government;
(iii) a corporation, partnership, joint venture, or other legal entity
organized or established under the laws of a foreign nation; or
(iv) a corporation more than 20 percent of the capital stock of which
is owned of record or voted by or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, an
alien or the representative of an alien, a foreign government or repre-
sentative of a foreign government, or a corporation, partnership, joint
venture, or other legal entity organized or established under the laws of
a foreign nation.
(B) The term "foreign telecommunications or telecommunications-related
service" means any telecommunications service or service provided by or
through the telecommunications facilities of a carrier, more than 20 percent
of the revenues or profit of which service accrues (or would accrue if dis-
bursements were made), directly or indirectly, to-
(i) an alien or the representative of an alien;
(ii) a foreign government or representative of a foreign government;
(iii) a corporation, partnership, joint venture, or other legal entity
organized or established under the laws of a foreign nation; or
(iv) a corporation more than 20 percent of the capital stock of which
is owned of record or voted by or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, an
alien or the representative of an alien, a foreign government or repre-
sentative of a foreign government, or a corporation, partnership, joint
venture, or other legal entity organized or established under the laws of
a foreign nation.
ADAPSO, The Needfor Reciprocity ir International Telecommunications (1981) (empha-
sis in original) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
193. S. 898 and H.R. 4177 both contemplate the involvement of the President and
other executive agencies in the final determination of whether the imposition of recipro-
cal restrictions is appropriate. See H.R. 4177, note 187 supra; S. 898, su.pra note 187,
§ 238(d).
194. S. 898 speaks of "foreign carriers or foreign persons supplying telecommunica-
tion or information services, facilities, or equipment." S. 898, supra note 187, § 238(a).
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cations facilities are no more favorable than those pursuant to which
similarly situated United States enterprises and services are permit-
ted to use foreign telecommunications facilities.
One advantage of such legislation is that the mere existence of
unambiguous Commission authority to impose reciprocal restric-
tions might, in many cases, be adequate to discourage the use of tele-
communications facilities by foreign administrations as non-tariff
barriers to trade. Had such an unambiguous statement of congres-
sional intent been in existence at the time that Cable and Wireless
denied service or at the time that KDD restricted the use of leased
channel circuits, it is questionable whether either foreign administra-
tion would have acted the way it did. Equally important, the Com-
mission would have been equipped to take prompt action to protect
the interests of United States users of international telecommunica-
tions facilities. Of particular value to the Commission in seeking a
reversal of the KDD and Cable and Wireless actions would have
been the power to impose identical or similar restrictions on users in
Hong Kong and Japan that wished to communicate with the United
States. 195  i.
Another significant provision of the legislation that has been
proposed involves a mandate to the Commission to investigate and
take action on its own initiative to secure the removal of transborder
dataflow restrictions. By permitting the Commission to act on its
own initiative and eliminating the need for such action to be taken at
the behest of an injured party, these legislative proposals will make
restrictions such as those now imposed by the Bundespost subject to
Commission scrutiny. The ability of the Commission to investigate
dataflow barriers on its own may prove to be particularly valuable in
cases where private parties, fearing retaliatory action by a foreign
PTT,196 might be reluctant to commence and actively participate in
formal proceedings before the Commission.
Whether any of these measures will ever be enacted remains to
be seen. In one sense, however, the propsals may already have had
an impact. By expressing legislative displeasure with the manner in
which the Commission and the executive branch have dealt with
H.R. 4177 addresses "foreign telecommunications services ... or related service" and
"foreign telecommunications carriers." H.R. 4177, note 187 supra.
195. In exercising its authority to impose reciprocal conditions or restrictions, the
Commission will have to deal with the fact that some restrictions may be prompted solely
by economic protectionism, some by a desire to protect personal privacy, and still others
by a combination of the two. Recent appropriations legislation has demonstrated a rec-
ognition, in a much different context, that reciprocity cannot always be applied in a
mechanical and inflexible fashion. See H.LR. RP. No. 102, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29,
59 (1981).
196. See note 157 supra.
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barriers to the transborder flow of information, the Congress may
have spurred them to greater efforts.
CONCLUSION
The use of telecommunications regulations as barriers to the
transborder flow of informaion is a growing phenomenon, particu-
larly among industrialized nations. To date, the formal regulatory
mechanisms of the United States have been ineffective in deterring,
much less eliminating, restrictive foreign telecommunications regula-
tions. When results favorable to the interests of users in the United
States have been achieved, it has largely been through the efforts of
agencies and individuals other than the Commission and its staff.
Although the Commission's statutory charter is currently
flexible enough to enable the Commission to combat such restric-
tions, the Commission has not chosen to pursue its statutory man-
date aggressively. Coupled with a lack of coordination with other
branches of government and the United States CCITT delegation,
the Commission's passive view of its role has exacerbated the
problems created by the current diffusion of responsibility for
national telecommunications and information policy within the fed-
eral government.
Congress has advanced several proposals to bring some order
and direction to the formulation and implementation of United
States policy. Whether any of these proposals will be enacted by
Congress or whether the Executive will in some way take the initia-
tive remains to be seen. Prompt and dramatic action, however, is
needed to halt the erection of new transborder dataflow barriers and
to deal effectively with all existing restrictions.

